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Summary: In the Court of Justice’s case law, association agree-
ments have been recognised as forming part of the communitarian 
legal system since the famous ‘Haegeman’ judgment in 1974. The 
new-generation association agreements concluded by the EU with its 
Eastern neighbour states explicitly offer a ‘stake in EU law’ as one 
of the incentives for neighbour states to adapt to the Union’s norma-
tive transfer. Less pronounced are perspectives on ‘association law’ 
itself which derives from the respective association agreements, as 
a distinct normative order with its own regulatory content that can 
influence both the associated country’s legal system as well as the 
EU’s and its Member States’ legal orders. This article aims to address 
this gap in the literature by first defining and outlining the features 
of the EU ‘association law’ phenomenon; it then aims to provide an 
account of the legal nature, regulatory content as well as the legal in-
stitutional and functional features of the EU-Ukraine ‘association law’ 
derived primarily from the Association Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union, its Member States and Ukraine, which entered in force on 
1 September 2017, as well as the burgeoning secondary association 
law, including joint-institutional acts. In what follows, the article will 
discuss the notion of EU ‘association law’ in the context of the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy and the so-called ‘new-generation as-
sociation agreements’. It will then outline the teleological nature and 
instrumental logic of the EU-Ukraine ‘association law’ as an institu-
tion of integration, just as it will also disentangle the many layers of 
the institution of ‘association law’ – from participatory to instrumental 
and integration-oriented association modalities.
1 Introduction: European Union ‘association law’ as an institution 
of law
In its 30th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2012), the European Commission voiced its concerns about multiple 
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incoming complaints on the application and interpretation of certain 
provisions of ‘the EU-Turkey association law’, in particular with regard 
to ‘the alleged violation by a number of Member States of the standstill 
clauses set out in the instruments governing the relations between Turkey 
and the European Union’.1 A year later, by referring Austria to the Court 
of Justice on 16 October 2014, the European Commission initiated the 
infringement procedures against its Member State for the alleged non-
compliance with the ‘EU-Turkey association law based on the Ankara 
agreement’.2 These two cases marked the moment when an EU institution 
had expressis verbis embraced the notion of EU ‘association law’. 
Although the European Court of Justice had recognised the association 
acquis, ie the regulatory content of the EC/EU’s association agreements, 
as part of the EC/EU legal system long ago, it was indeed the inside-out 
perspective on the matter that has shaped by far the understanding of 
association law as a legal exercise in extending the regulatory content 
of EU law to third countries. The Court was quite explicit on this in a 
series of its judgments since the Haegeman (1974) dictum on association 
agreements forming part of the communitarian legal system.3 However, 
both the implementation and interpretation of the Ankara Agreement, 
as well as the active engagement of the EU-Turkey Association Council 
in developing further the association acquis, revealed the trend of an 
interactionist, rather than one-way subordinate, relationship between 
the EU legal system and the EU-Turkey association law, thus endowing 
the latter with some features of a normative order-shaping institution 
per se. The variety of the EU’s contemporary and legacy association 
agreements concluded worldwide, which constitute all possible models 
of contractual association from ‘free trade plus 1% to membership minus 
1%’, as famously put by the Commission’s first President Walter Hallstein, 
suggests that there is much more diversified interaction between the EU’s 
own and associated legal orders. This cannot but even further increase 
1 Commission, ‘30th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2012)’ Com-
mission Staff Working Document SWD(2013) 433.
2 Commission, ‘Commission Takes Austria to Court of Justice over Non-compliance with 
EU-Turkey Association Agreement’ (2014) (Press release) IP/14/1143 <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-14-1143_en.htm> accessed 12 February 2015. 
3 In 1974, the ECJ ruled in the Haegeman case that the ‘Athens Agreement’ (the EC-
Greece Association Agreement of 1961), including its protocols and annexes, ‘form an in-
tegral part of Community law’ from their entry into force. See Case 181/73 R & V Haege-
man v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:1974:41. When delivering judgment in the Demirel case in 
1987, the ECJ confirmed that the provisions of association agreements ‘form an integral 
part of the Community legal system’. See Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:400. A couple of years later, in 1990, the Court extended the scope of 
the stake of the (EU-Turkey) ‘association law’ in the EU’s legal system by deciding, in the 
Sevince case, that decisions adopted by Association Councils form part of Union law, as 
association agreements, as from their entry into force, themselves do. See Case C-192/89 
Sevince ECLI:EU:C:1990:322.
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‘the rising complexity of EU law’4 and invite scholarly deliberations on 
the nature and effects of particular association laws and – proxy – legal 
orders, with their distinct teleology and regulatory content. Whereas legal 
and political scholarships have produced a number of analyses of the 
EC/EU’s association agreements, only a handful have attempted to study 
this type of EU agreement with third states from the perspective of socio-
legal institutional analysis – ie treating ‘association law’ as a specific 
normative order. Along with the pioneering case of the Ankara association 
law,5 the literature features accounts on the association law of the EU’s 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina,6 
EEA law,7 and, more recently, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.8
The European Union law perspective on the association agreements 
invites, inter alia, yet another differentiation between the levels of ‘associ-
ation law’ norms.9 Thus, the body of EU association law in each case can, 
in principle, be divided into the primary law of association agreed upon by 
the contracting parties themselves (ie Association Agreements, concluded 
as mixed agreements between the EU, its Member States and a third 
country) and the secondary law of association added by decisions of the 
joint body in the wake of primary law application and implementation (ie 
non-EU institutional acts, such as the decisions of respective Association 
Councils). Certainly, this (yet another kind of) primary and secondary law 
only further contributes to the rising complexity of EU law – but it is also 
necessary to understand the dynamics of it. A rather hesitant – though 
steadily increasing – use of the ‘association law’ term in the EU’s official 
institutional discourse,10 accompanied by an all too infrequent account of 
4 Peter-Christian Müller-Graff and Ola Mestad (eds), The Rising Complexity of European 
Law (BWV Verlag 2014).
5 Belgin Akçay and Sebnem Akipek (eds), Turkey’s Integration into the European Union: 
Legal Dimension. (Lexington Books 2013).
6 Zlatan Meškić and Darko Samardžić, ‘The Application of International and EU Law in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in Siniša Rodin and Tamara Perišin (eds), Judicial Application of 
International Law in Southeast Europe (Springer-Verlag 2015).
7 Carl Baudenbacher (ed), The Handbook of EEA Law (Springer 2016).
8 Guillaume Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area: A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration Without Membership 
(Brill 2016).
9 This kind of differentiation between the levels and kinds of contractual association 
norms is particularly popular in German literature, where the notions of ‘primary law of 
association’ (‘primäres Assoziationsrecht’) and ‘secondary law of association’ (‘sekundäres 
Assoziationsrecht’) feature quite frequently. See, for instance, Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Arti-
cle 51 TEU and Article 217 TFEU’ in C Calliess and M Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV Kommentar 
(4th ed, Verlag CH Beck 2011) paras16-33.
10 The EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) search for ‘association law’ returns so far only 
six relevant results, all of them being documents issued by the European Commission since 
2013 which, as a matter of fact, exclusively deal with the ‘EU-Turkey association law’ (also 
known as the ‘Ankara association law’). See, eg, Commission Staff Working Documents 
SWD(2013) 433 of 22 October 2013; SWD(2015) 134 final of 9 July 2015; SWD(2016) 231 
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the notion in the scholarly literature, invite an effort to provide an oper-
ating definition of the term. Herewith, ‘EU association law’ is defined as 
an institution of law that creates a distinct normative order embedded in 
both the EU’s and the third country’s legal systems and provides for two-
way interaction between them, rather than one-way rule transfer. Such an 
institutional-legal perspective encompasses not only the well-elaborated 
view from the literature on the transfer of EU law and norms to third 
states, but also the largely neglected facet of the effects that the EU’s in-
ternational agreements11 – and the related ‘association law’ orders – wield 
upon the European Union legal system and its Member States, as set out 
in the ECJ’s growing case law on the subject matter and the Commis-
sion’s statements.
Such an understanding of the EU ‘association law’ phenomenon 
draws on the synthetic structural-functionalist view of law-as-institution 
and the exercise of neofunctionalist extraterritoriality. The institutional 
character of European Union ‘association law’ is enshrined in the struc-
ture of legal authority (norms and practices) that frames the interpre-
tation and implementation of the Union’s association agreements. The 
power of legal authority rests on prescribed action in a manner endowed 
with specific meaning (norm application) and sanction in the case of de-
viant (in)action (norm enforcement). Being action- and thus practice-re-
lated law – as a system of rules enforceable through social institutions 
to govern behaviour – can itself be treated as an institution.12 La Torre13 
defines law-as-institution as ‘the constitutive rule or norm of a practice’ 
that is ‘the condition for the conceivability (ex ante) and perceivability (ex 
post), and hence possibility, of a sphere of action’. To put it simpler in 
the author’s own words: ‘The institution is here effective and structured 
praxis’.14 Given that the exercise of such practice extends beyond the 
EU legal order strictly defined, this endows the proxy normative order 
of association law with the features of extraterritoriality and functional 
extension that is necessary to ensure the interaction between at least 
final of 15 July 2016. The first mention of the ‘association law’ notion used expressis verbis 
in EU-institutional, ie non-academic, discourse is apparently traceable to AG Trštenjak’s 
Opinion delivered on 13 March 2008 in Case C-204/07 P CAS SpA v Commission of the 
European Communities ECLI:EU:C:2008:175, where she clearly differentiated between the 
‘implementation of the [EU-Turkey] Association Agreement and association law derived 
from it’, thus pointing to the distinct and institutionalised nature of the ‘association law’ 
phenomenon in the EU legal order.
11 Mario Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements (OUP 2013).
12 See, for instance, the following well-founded accounts on ‘law as an institution’, and 
‘law as institutional normative order’: Massimo La Torre, Law as Institution (Springer 2010); 
Hamish Ross, Law as a Social Institution (Hart Publishing 2001); Maksymilian Del Mar and 
Zenon Bankowski, Law as Institutional Normative Order (Ashgate 2009).
13 La Torre (n 12) 117.
14 ibid.
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three distinct legal orders – ie the EU’s own legal order, the national le-
gal orders of EU Member States, and the third country’s legal order. De 
Búrca’s15 neofunctionalist perspective on law finely embraces the idea of 
functional extension of EU law via the practice of ‘association law’, while 
building on such constructs as the instrumental self-interest of actors 
enjoying legal authority as a motivating force for integrationist behav-
iour, the substantial spill-over effect of adjudication in EU’s legal order, 
geographical spill-over, and extraterritorialisation of the Union’s law, etc. 
Scott’s16 seminal pieces on the ‘extraterritoriality and territorial exten-
sion of EU law’ allow us to grasp the inside-out logic of European Union 
rule(s) travelling abroad. Although the author admits that ‘the enactment 
of extraterritorial legislation by the EU is extremely rare’, nevertheless, 
‘the EU makes frequent recourse to a legislative technique that [can be] 
term[ed] territorial extension, in order to gain regulatory traction over 
activities that take place abroad’.17 In a way, such practice of territorial 
extension enables the European Union ‘to govern activities that are not 
centered upon the territory of the EU and to shape the focus and content 
of third country and international law’.18 This resonates with internation-
al relations and political science literature on the ‘functionalist extension’ 
of EU governance to the neighbour-state domestic orders.19 The literature 
is, however, rather silent on the outside-in effects of the ‘association law’ 
normative bodies on the EU’s own and its Member States’ legal orders. 
The rising volume of the Court of Justice’s case law and institutional 
acts on this matter, as well as the distinct scope of the related regulatory 
content in each case, point to the need to include this aspect in scholarly 
deliberations on the nature of the European Union’s multiple and varying 
proxy normative orders of ‘association law’. 
This article aims to address this gap in the literature by first defin-
ing and outlining the features of the EU ‘association law’ phenomenon; 
it then aims to provide an account of the legal nature, regulatory scope 
and content as well as legal-institutional and functional features of the 
EU-Ukraine ‘association law’ derived from the Association Agreement be-
tween the European Union, its Member States and Ukraine, which en-
tered in force on 1 September 2017, as well as the burgeoning secondary 
association law, including joint-institutional acts. In what follows, the 
15 Gráinne De Búrca, ‘Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory’ (2005) 12(2) Journal of 
European Public Policy 310.
16 Joanne Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’ (2014) 62(1) Amer-
ican Journal of Comparative Law 87; Joanne Scott, ‘The New EU ‘Extraterritoriality’’ (2014) 
51(5) CML Rev 1343.
17 Scott 2014 ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’ (n 16) 87.
18 ibid, 89. 
19 See, for instance, Sandra Lavenex, ‘The Power of Functionalist Extension: How EU Rules 
Travel’ (2014) 21(6) Journal of European Public Policy 885. 
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article will discuss the notion of EU ‘association law’ in the context of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the so-called ‘new-generation as-
sociation agreements’. It will then also outline the teleological nature and 
instrumental logic of the EU-Ukraine association law as an institution of 
integration, and will disentangle the many layers of the ‘association law’ 
institution – from participatory to instrumental and integration-oriented 
association modalities.
2 Association-cum-integration: the EU ‘association law’ in the 
context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
 new-generation association agreements 
The dilemma that the European Union faces when developing con-
tractual links with its immediate neighbourhood is that of a choice be-
tween ‘enlargement or empire’, as densely featured in both public and 
political discourses in Europe and beyond. Whereas the first one pre-
sents the case of the EU’s inclusive approach, ie through establishing 
accession-oriented association relationships, the latter builds on a rather 
politicised premise of the EU’s exclusionary association below member-
ship. As a matter of fact, association agreements – especially in their 
new-generation fashion – provide for a meaningful stake in EU law and 
the communitarian legal system, thus not being all that exclusionist per 
se. Furthermore, the elements that provide for sustainable and far-reach-
ing interdependence between the EU and third states, such as Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade or Political Dialogue and Association, endow 
the new-generation association agreements with a more encompassing 
and inclusive rationale, thus stimulating integration through associa-
tion – even if below the EU full-fledged membership level. The ‘integration 
through association’ (or ‘association-cum-integration’) approach is what 
characterises the new generation of the EU’s ‘association law’ that allows 
for a third country’s stake in EU law and the internal market, and it also 
gives EU Member States a stake in third countries’ legal systems. These 
features provide for the EU’s ‘special’ contractual association with the 
countries embraced within the European Neighbourhood Policy Frame-
work.20 Certainly, the asymmetry comes to profile that kind of legal sys-
tem interaction, where the EU’s regulatory content is essentially extend-
ed to the neighbouring normative orders. The mechanisms of legislative 
and regulatory approximation extend the enforceable rule (law export) of 
the European Union to the associated neighbourhood. Export of norms 
and the extended normative impact do not indeed safeguard the (a) cred-
ibility or determination and (b) capability of neighbour state governments 
20 Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays (CUP 2014) 
470-474. 
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to enforce the translation of these norms into domestic rule. Enforcement 
or compliance is only possible in conditions of effective regulatory impact, 
ie extended rule. Significantly, the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly’s 
2013 resolution expressly pinpoints the difference between legislative 
and regulatory approximation and the challenge emerging from it for the 
EU’s engagement in the neighbourhood:
the main challenge for the Eastern partnership countries does not 
lie so much in the approximation of their legal texts as in the trans-
formation and adaptation of their respective administrations, justice 
systems and societies to the conditions necessary to ensure that the 
legislation is defective and well implemented.21
The 2009 Prague Eastern Partnership Summit had also been atten-
tive to this issue. In its Joint Declaration, it designated new association 
agreements as tools for achieving greater legislative and regulatory ap-
proximation with the Eastern neighbours:
New Association Agreements, beyond existing opportunities for trade 
and investment, will provide for the establishment or the objective 
of establishing deep and comprehensive free trade areas, where 
the positive effects of trade and investment liberalization will be 
strengthened by regulatory approximation leading to convergence 
with EU laws and standards.22 
Legislative and regulatory approximation is crucial to those partner 
countries willing to make progress in coming closer to the EU.23
Such a goal is truly ambitious and poses considerable challenges for 
the uniform interpretation and effective application of exported EU norms in 
the non-member states.24 Yet it is truly difficult to assess the effectiveness 
of legislative approximation in the Eastern Partnership countries, which 
has been promoted by the EU for almost half a decade as a successful 
Europeanisation mechanism, while the regulatory element of the Union’s 
influence in the neighbourhood evidently gains incremental significance.
21 EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Resolution on Approximation of the National Leg-
islation of Eastern Partnership Countries with EU Legislation in the Economic Field’ (28 
May 2013) para 6 <www.euronest.europarl.europa.eu/euronest/webdav/shared/general_doc-
uments/third_ordinary_session_2013/Resolutions/resolution_econ_28052013_en.pdf> ac-
cessed 28 May 2016.
22 Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership 
Summit’ 8435/09 (7 May 2009)   para 5 <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neigh-
bourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf> accessed 
18 June 2015
23 ibid, para 9.
24 Adam Łazowski, ‘Enhanced Multilateralism and Enhanced Bilateralism: Integration 
Without Membership in the European Union’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 1433.
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In terms of extending its regulatory governance (at least) to the ‘near 
abroad’, the European Union finds itself in a well-suited setting of prem-
ises, which include: first, the constitutionalised mandate for active en-
gagement in external relations, along with the specific ‘transformative’ 
or ‘neighbour-state building’ mandate as set by article 8 TEU; second, 
successful evidence from ‘integration without membership’ attained via 
extending the EU’s regulatory governance to the countries of the Euro-
pean Economic Area and Switzerland; third, sophisticatedly devised and 
legally binding new regulatory mechanisms such as (enhanced) associa-
tion agreements that include deep and comprehensive free trade areas; 
fourth, experience in building functional states by integrating them into 
the EU’s organisational and regulatory boundaries; and, fifth, a unique 
opportunity to stabilise the neighbourhood and mitigate the exclusion-
ism effects by deploying a differentiated strategy and opening up Euro-
pean Union law as an institution to share.
Along with the introduced institutional and polity-related changes 
(abolition of the EU’s pillar structure), the Treaty of Lisbon innovatively 
constitutionalised the Union’s external relations with the neighbouring 
countries, including the neighbourhood policies. Inclusion of a legal ba-
sis for the European Union’s relations with neighbours into the primary 
law corpus, ie the founding treaties, is of crucial significance – as excel-
lently explained by Hillion:
By constitutionalising it, the Lisbon Treaty has modified the nature 
of the Union’s neighbourhood policy, particularly in view of the man-
datory language it contains. By locating it in the Common Provisions 
of the TEU, the treaty drafters have given a considerable prominence 
to neighbourhood policy in the Union’s action, confirming its all-en-
compassing dimension and endowing it with a bold finalité by refer-
ence to EU values.25
Along with the provisions of articles 3(5) and 21 TEU, which express 
an imperative for the action of the European Union in international rela-
tions to be guided by the values and principles that inspired its own crea-
tion and development, this is precisely article 8 TEU, which even further 
specifies and obliges26 the Union to engage in its neighbourhood. The use 
of the ‘shall’ formulation in the article indicates that such an engage-
ment is compulsory and thus constraining upon the Union’s institutions. 
Failure to comply, ie to act, on the part of the EU may be qualified as an 
unlawful ‘failure to act’ which is subject to judicial proceedings under 
25 Christophe Hillion, ‘The EU Neighbourhood Competence under Article 8 TEU’ (2013) 3 
SIEPS European Policy Analysis 5 <http://sieps.se/sites/default/files/2013_3epa.pdf> ac-
cessed 17 June 2015.
26 Schütze (n 20) 471.
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article 265 TFEU before the European Court of Justice, in line with past 
practices. Hillion27 denotes that, due to this peculiarity, ‘the exercise of 
the neighbourhood competence differs significantly from that of enlarge-
ment’ which is hardly a compulsory mandate under both primary and 
secondary EU law. Moreover, the exercise of an active neighbourhood 
policy (in the mode of ‘active’, or ‘constitutive’ engagement) is not subject to 
any conditions, wherefore ‘[t]he neighbourhood competence could thus be 
equated with other EU common policies, such as agriculture, transport 
or the common commercial policy, which all involve a strong command 
for the Union to act’. 28 It is increasingly due to the rising effects of the 
internal/external security nexus that the conditionality approach is be-
ing made partly inappropriate: the Union’s strategic interests as security 
consumer (and not only provider) in the neighbourhood cannot be made 
dependent upon neighbour-states’ willingness and capability to cohere 
and comply. A proactive policy of neighbour-state transformation and ex-
tension of European regulatory governance to the neighbourhood is thus 
the rationale beyond the wording of article 8 TEU, the innovatory ‘trans-
formative’ or ‘neighbour-state building’ mandate.29
Obviously, in order to accomplish such a programme of extended 
governance and simultaneous statebuilding, genuinely effective regulatory 
mechanisms are needed which would go beyond approximating standards 
(norms) and entail regulating or enforceable elements (rule). An enhanced 
version of contractual association agreements, encompassing deep and 
comprehensive free trade areas, is increasingly seen in the literature to 
present such a tool. In fact, the association agreements are probably 
the most extensively used legal instrument of EU external relations, ie 
the most recognisable EU foreign-political ‘brand’ – and, as such, it has 
experienced a genuine boom, or inflation, of ‘associated countries’, with 
the agreements concluded in the early 1960s with Greece and Turkey 
as the initial point of reference in this regard. In recent years, however, 
the European Union has developed a new, more ambitious model of 
contractual association that includes a deep and comprehensive free 
trade area. This new generation of agreements, primarily designed for 
regulating the EU’s relations with Ukraine, but lately also extended to 
Moldova and Georgia (as well as offered to other Eastern Partnership 
countries, but so far declined by Armenia and Azerbaijan), is sought to 
27 Christophe Hillion, ‘Anatomy of EU Norm Export Towards the Neighbourhood: The Im-
pact of Article 8 TEU’ in Peter Van Elsuwege and Roman Petrov (eds), Legislative Approxi-
mation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union: 
Towards a Common Regulatory Space? (Routledge 2014), 16.
28 ibid, 17.
29 Andriy Tyushka, ‘Building the Neighbours: The EU’s New Association Agreements and 
Structural Power in the Eastern Neighbourhood’ (2017) 25(1) Journal of Contemporary 
Central and Eastern Europe 45.
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embody what Gänzle30 regards as the process of ‘externalising the EU 
governance’ beyond borders. As a matter of fact, this would mean, in 
structural-institutional terms, bringing the neighbouring countries as 
close as possible, although stopping short of granting them Member State 
status. Delcour and Wolczuk single out the explicitly regulative and truly 
transformative nature of the enhanced association agreements with the 
DCFTA components as their integral parts:
Deep economic integration is not just about legal and regulatory 
convergence with EU standards. […]. DCFTAs thus give flesh to the 
EU’s blueprint for its neighbourhood policy. They are a ‘vital trade 
instrument for building up long-term economic relationships’ with 
Eastern neighbours and their impact goes far ‘beyond purely trade 
issues, also influencing the state of democracy, the rule of law and 
other common standards’ […]. The EU thus bestows upon DCFTAs 
transformative power: they are expected to modernise partner coun-
tries’ economies and bring about broad political changes.31
Building long-term special relationships and the establishment 
of shared regulatory spaces, along with the granted stake in the EU’s 
internal market, are thus sought not only to transform the states in 
the neighbourhood according to a phenomenal (even though difficultly 
palatable and identifiable) ‘European statehood’ template, but also to serve 
as domestic legitimation and exclusionism mitigating narratives, primarily 
through the reflexive medium of (shared) law. The debates around the 
European Neighbourhood Policy strongly revolve around its ‘distinct-
from-membership’ nature, which inevitably tends to frame the narratives 
of exclusionism and ‘otherness’ in the neighbouring countries. Calling for 
reconsideration of the concept of ‘neighbour’, Meloni contends that the 
current narrative of ‘this term, far from being uncontested, fundamentally 
implies an “othering” practice’.32 Structured and possibly the closest 
policy-oriented cooperation, along with economic integration, framed by 
the discourse of shared law, may facilitate the reconstituting of the ‘we’ vs 
‘non-we’ identities with the EU’s closest – direct – neighbours. In Smith’s 
firm belief, the ‘intensive structured dialogues with the most significant 
outsiders in [the neighbourhood] is a creative way of attempting to move 
“beyond boundary”’.33 The boundaries of ins and outs, while ‘sharing 
30 Stefan Gänzle, ‘Externalizing the EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Towards a Framework for Analysis’ (Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Political Science Association, UBC, Vancouver, 4–6 June 2008) <www.cpsa-acsp.
ca/papers-2008/gaenzle.pdf> accessed 21 June 2016.
31 Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Beyond the Vilnius Summit: Challenges for 
Deeper EU Integration with Eastern Europe’ European Policy Centre – Policy Brief, 31 Oc-
tober 2013, 4. <www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3889_beyond_the_vilnius_summit.
pdf> accessed 21 January 2015, 
32 Gabriella Meloni, ‘Who’s My Neighbour?’ (2007) 7 European Political Economy Review 
24, 24.
33 Michael Smith, ‘The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Bounda-
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everything but institutions’, ought to incrementally get blurred, where the 
language of law, so to say, replaces the language of power, to paraphrase 
Kratochwil.34 Ultimately, the associated states are by definition part of the 
European Union legal system, and this is the institution of European law, 
which the Union can effectively share with the associated neighbourhood.
3 The EU-Ukraine ‘association law’ as an institution of integration
For the entire past decade, the notion and scope of new contrac-
tual relationships between the EU and Ukraine have remained one of the 
most debated topics in academia and among policy makers. To a great 
extent, this was due to the agreement’s anticipated innovatory and model 
nature, yet it was sought to serve as a point of reference and actual ‘tem-
plate’35 for other agreements establishing enhanced association links be-
tween the Union and – the essentially non-associated eastern European 
– neighbourhood, given that some of the southern neighbour countries 
embraced by the ENP framework have already been contractually associ-
ated with the European Union. 
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement goes substantially ‘beyond 
and above’ the Union’s former Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
with Ukraine, but also with regard to other association agreements that 
the EU has concluded with third countries across the globe. This is spe-
cifically the case because of the genuine integrative nature of the insti-
tution of association law established with the EU-Ukrainian association 
agreement. It enables not only a ‘stake in the EU internal market’, which 
is explicitly declared as an association objective, but also provides for an 
implicit ‘stake in the Union law’ as well, yet – by both the definition and 
EC/EU adjudication – the associated countries are part of the EU nor-
mative-legal system. Notably, the very process of European integration, 
which has led to the creation of the European Union, has been essentially 
driven by law. To agree with Eriksen:
The European integration process has been driven by law, which is a 
reflexive medium for solving problems and conflicts in modern socie-
ties. Law is a conscious and self-referential medium, which cannot 
be fully auto-poetic for a long time without ‘irritating’ (pace Niklas 
Luhmann) other social forces.36
ries of Order’ (1996) 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 5, 17.
34 Friedrich V Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (CUP 1995).
35 According to the GAERC’s 2007 statement, ‘certain aspects of [an Enhanced Agreement 
with Ukraine] could serve as model for other ENP partners in the future’. See Press Release 
of the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting on 18 June 2007, 10657/07 
(Presse 138).
36 Erik O Eriksen, The Normativity of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 5-6.
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Neyer and Wiener also emphasise in this regard the ‘constitutive im-
portance of law’37 in the process of the most recent Eastern enlargement 
that was pursued via the EU’s pre-accession association. Similarly, the 
EU-Ukrainian enhanced association is built on the firm premise of asso-
ciation law that – translated into association politics – presents a poten-
tially effective mode of ‘outsider’ integration, ie integration through law.
Against this backdrop, understanding of the substance and effects 
of association law and modalities of stake in EU law, including along the 
lines of the legal imperative of consistent (EU law-conform) interpretation 
of association law, is extremely significant for grasping the integrative 
nature of the EU-Ukrainian association model. Herewith, the notion of 
the EU-Ukraine ‘association law’ is understood as a compound normative 
and regulatory corpus formed by the primary association law (the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement itself, including its Annexes and Proto-
cols, as well possible future declarations and amendments) and the sec-
ondary association law (the burgeoning association legislation, including 
first and foremost decisions of the association bodies made in the wake 
of the application and implementation of the Agreement).38 
Owing to the multi-layered and proxy constitutive structure of this 
specific body of law, its different position in the hierarchy of norms within the 
European Union’s and Ukrainian legal orders warrants special attention. 
Whereas the incorporation of international law, first and foremost in 
the form of international treaties (agreement), follows in the case of the 
European Union a seemingly monist approach, it is the semi-dualist 
approach that, to a certain extent, defines the Ukrainian legal system’s 
view of international law, thus necessitating the passing of legislation (law 
on ratification) that ‘translates’ the international agreement in question 
into Ukrainian law. In both cases, however, international agreements 
concluded by the EU or Ukraine, respectively, enjoy ‘supra-legislative’ 
status, thus prevailing over (legislative and non-legislative) acts of the 
37 Jürgen Neyer and Antje Wiener, Political Theory of the European Union (OUP 2011) 37.
38 In view of the fact that the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement became fully enacted 
relatively recently (1 September 2017), the body of the EU-Ukraine association law does not 
yet feature considerable legislation and legal practice (secondary association law) – thus 
being mainly formed by the text of the association agreement itself (primary association 
law). This might invite thinking on the very existence of the EU-Ukraine association law 
as a premature idea. Such an approach, however, would inevitably neglect the nature and 
role of the existing multi-layered primary EU-Ukraine association law in creating a distinct 
legal order. Furthermore, the legal practice of EU relations with contractually associated 
countries would also suggest that both the nature and scope of the association agreement 
and the dynamic development, which it is exposed to on its application and implementation 
path, cannot deny the existence of a distinct normative order of association as such. As the 
practice of the Ankara Agreement since 1963 has showcased, the body of association law 
is a dynamic and evolving phenomenon, with secondary association legislation being – pro-
gressively – responsible for this throughout the agreement’s application and implementa-
tion framework.
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European Union or Ukraine’s legislative acts (both adopted in the anterior 
and posterior manner). At the same time, the concluded international 
agreements cannot have priority over Ukraine’s national or the EU’s 
supranational constitutive acts, ie the Ukrainian Constitution or the EU 
founding treaties, respectively. It follows that the EU-Ukraine primary 
association law (the provisions of the association agreement) prevails 
over the potentially conflicting provisions of the EU’s legislative and non-
legislative acts, as well as over those of Ukraine’s national legislation. In 
the event of a collision of norms forming part of primary association law, 
on the one hand, with the EU’s supra-constitutional norms or Ukraine’s 
national constitutional norms, on the other, each of the latter two will be 
given priority.39 In the hierarchy of law within the EU legal system, EU-
Ukraine secondary association law is below primary association law, thus 
sharing – in a rather non-hierarchical fashion – the same position as the 
EU’s institutional acts. In the Ukrainian legal system, the positioning is 
even more complicated, not least due to the so far missing precedents of 
this sort in practice, as well as the general characteristics of the dualist 
legal system which is not based on precedents; secondary association 
law, adopted in the wake of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’s 
implementation, should enjoy the same level as the agreement itself. In 
a similar fashion, the positioning of EU-Ukraine primary and secondary 
association law will, too, differ in its third dimension, ie among the twenty-
eight national legal orders of the EU Member States, depending on their – 
monist or dualist – approach to international law and the extent to which 
their national legal systems have meanwhile become ‘Europeanised’. 
Therefore, the distinction between two levels of the EU-Ukraine association 
law has intrinsic practical repercussions for the (direct) application40 and 
39 Whereas EU case law has consistently held that international agreements concluded 
by the EU are binding upon its institutions (and, consequently, prevail over EU institu-
tional acts), they cannot overrule or prejudice the EU’s supra-constitutional meta-norms, 
ie the constitutional principles of the founding treaties, as ruled in the Kadi case. See 
Case C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461. On the possibilities and limits of incorporating international (asso-
ciation) law in the EU legal order, see Koen Lenaerts, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect 
of International Law in the EU Legal Order’ in Inge Govaere, Erwan Lannon, Peter Van 
Elsuwegem and Stanislas Adam (eds), The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour 
of Marc Maresceau (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014). On the challenges of incorporating 
association law in the Ukraine’s constitutional order, see Roman Petrov, ‘Constitutional 
Challenges for the Implementation of Association Agreements between the EU and Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia,’ (2015) 21(2) European Public Law 241.
40 In assessing the legal effects of the EU-Ukraine association law, as constituted by the 
dynamic body of primary and secondary legal norms and practices, two different, albeit 
intertwined, concepts need to be drawn into analysis: direct applicability and direct effect. 
The matters of direct effect with regard to the EU-Ukraine association law will be discussed 
below in the text (n 115). The question of the direct applicability of the EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement and the enacted (as well as future) secondary association law in the form 
of Association Council decisions needs to be assessed distinctively (ie separately from one 
another) and individually (for each of the three normative orders involved). First, in the EU’s 
case, the EU institutions are bound by the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (as per the 
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(effective) implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 
the EU, its Member States and in Ukraine.
Beyond the text of the association agreement itself, the corpus of 
the EU-Ukraine primary association law also includes, since 2016, two 
further types of normative acts. This is reflected in the – so far – five-tier 
structure of the EU-Ukraine primary association law, now comprising:   
a) the international – ‘mixed’ – agreement concluded between the Eu-
ropean Union, its Member States and Ukraine: the ‘Association 
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, 
of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part’ concluded on 21 
March 2014 (Preamble, Article 1, Titles I, II and VII) and 27 June 
2014 (Titles III, IV, V, and VII; related Annexes and Protocols), 
provisionally applicable since 1 November 2014 (Titles III, V, VI 
and VII – to the extent it is EU competence) and 1 January 2016 
(Title IV – to the extent it is EU competence), fully effective since 1 
September 2017;41
b) an additional international agreement adopted in the form of ‘De-
cision’ made in the framework of the European Council: the ‘Deci-
sion of the Heads of State or Government of the 28 Member States 
of the European Union, meeting within the European Council’ of 
15 December 2016, annexed to the European Council Conclu-
sions on Ukraine;42 
Council Decisions listed in n 43 and n 44 below) and the resulting secondary association 
legislation. By virtue of its comprehensive nature and specific logic, the EU-Ukraine As-
sociation Agreement should, in principle, be able to be directly applicable (see Lenaerts (n 
39) 45-46) – unless the contracting parties, either explicitly or implicitly, agreed otherwise 
in view of the necessary implementing measures. The question arises whether the stipula-
tions of arts 5 and 3 of Council Decisions 2017/1247 (n 43) and 2017/1248 (n 44), respec-
tively, can be interpreted as statements on the necessary further implementation measures. 
Second, the Decision of 28 EU Member States (n 42), adopted as a separate international 
agreement, pinpoints the concurrent ‘intention’ of the second party to this agreement not 
to render its provisions direct enforceability. Finally, third, in Ukraine’s case, it needs to 
be distinguished between the primary association law, which – by virtue of being part of 
Ukraine’s legislation (article 9 of the Constitution of Ukraine) – is potentially capable of be-
ing directly enforced, and the secondary association law, which most probably will neces-
sitate implementing measures (laws) in order to be directly applicable.
41 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and Ukraine, of the other part [2014] OJ L161/3; Ugoda pro Asotsiatsiyu mizh Ukray-
inoyu, z odniyeyi storony, ta Yevropeyskym Soyuzom, Yevropeyskym Spivtovarystvom z 
Atomnoyi Energiyi i jikhnimy derzhavamy-chlenamy, z inshoyi storony [Association Agree-
ment between Ukraine, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, 
of the other part]. Verkhovna Rada, doc no. 984_011 (version as of 30 November 2015) 
<http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011> accessed 7 November 2017. The texts of 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in other official languages of the European Union are 
authentic and thus also form part of this tier of the EU-Ukraine primary association law. 
42 Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 28 Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, meeting within the European Council, annexed to the European Council 
Conclusions on Ukraine of 15 December 2016 (EUCO 34/16) <www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/24151/15-euco-conclusions-ukraine.pdf> accessed 7 November 2017. 
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c) twenty-eight EU-Ukraine association agreement ratification docu-
ments adopted by the EU Member States; 
d) two EU institutional acts on the conclusion and application of the 
association agreement: Council Decisions (EU) no 2017/124743 
and no 2017/124844 of 11 July 2017 on the conclusion of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement on behalf of the European Union;
e) the legislative act of the Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada on the ratifica-
tion of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Law of Ukraine no 
1678-VII of 16 September 2014.45
The Association Agreement between the European Union and 
Ukraine accounts for more than two thousand pages and is structur-
ally composed of a preamble, seven parts, 43 annexes and 3 protocols.46 
Thereby, the provisions on economic and sector cooperation, including 
those on the establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, 
account for nearly 95% of the whole agreement content (see Table 1 an-
nexed for an illustrative structure and content outline of the main part of 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement).
The corpus of the EU-Ukraine secondary association law is largely in 
its inception stage. The EU-Ukraine Association Council, operative since 
1 November 2014 (as per start of the agreement’s provisional application), 
has issued up until now three – constitutive and procedural – decisions, 
including on the rules of procedure,47 the establishment of two sub-
committees,48 and on the delegation of certain powers by the Association 
43 Council Decision (EU) 2017/1247 of 11 July 2017 on the conclusion, on behalf of the 
European Union, of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of 
the other part, with the exception of the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country 
nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the other party [2017] OJ L181/1. 
44 Council Decision (EU) 2017/1248 of 11 July 2017 on the conclusion, on behalf of the 
European Union, of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, 
of the other part, as regards provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals 
legally employed as workers in the territory of the other party [2017] OJ L181/4.
45 Zakon Ukrayiny pro Ratyfikatsiyu Ugody pro Asotsiatsiyu mizh Ukrayinoyu, z odniyeyi 
storony, ta Yevropeyskym Soyuzom, Yevropeyskym Spivtovarystvom z Atomnoyi Energiyi i 
jikhnimy derzhavamy-chlenamy, z inshoyi storony [Law of Ukraine on Ratification of the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement] Nr 1678-VII, 16.09.2014, Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady 
Ukrayiny (2014) no 40, 2021.
46 See the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of 
the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part OJ L 161/3.
47 Decision No 1/2014 of the EU-Ukraine Association Council of 15 December 2014 adopt-
ing its Rules of Procedure and those of the Association Committee and of Subcommittees 
[2015/977] OJ L157/99.
48 Decision No 2/2014 of the EU-Ukraine Association Council of 15 December 2014 on the 
establishment of two Sub-Committees [2015/978] OJ L157/110.
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Council to the Association Committee in Trade configuration.49 It may be 
assumed, however, that further secondary association legislation in the 
context of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is in traction – especially 
as regards the territorial scope of the agreement’s application in view of 
the ongoing conflict in Ukraine’s eastern region and the currently Russia-
occupied territory of the Crimean peninsula. In a similar context of a frozen 
conflict, with the de facto state of the Pridniestrovian Moldavian Republic 
(PMR) existing, since 1990, within the de jure territorial jurisdiction of 
the Republic of Moldova, the newly operational EU-Moldova Association 
Council made one of its first decisions on the application of Title V (Trade 
and Trade-related matters) of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement 
‘to the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova’.50 The EU-Ukraine 
Association Council should be expected to regulate this aspect of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement application as well – just as it will have 
to deal, at some point, with the issue of the unilaterally precluded direct 
effect of the agreement in the EU legal order as per Council Decisions (EU) 
no 2017/124751 and no 2017/1248,52 as will be discussed below.
One may preliminarily conclude that the EU-Ukraine association law 
displays a double (r)evolutionary nature. First, the revolutionary nature 
of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement itself, as a benchmarking con-
tractual deal for the Union’s enhanced association policy, is essentially 
derived from its far-reaching teleology and integration-oriented elements 
of the agreement content. The latter is not narrowly framed by a classi-
cal FTA scope; nor is it constrained by the EU’s exclusive competences. 
Covering policy areas and issues that extend beyond the Union’s powers, 
it draws on complementary EU Member States’ commitments for provid-
ing broader framework of EU-Ukraine interaction and closer cooperation 
– and, as such, it opens up a new dimension of political dialogue, along 
with economic integration. Second, the evolutionary nature of both the 
primary association law and the burgeoning secondary association leg-
islation endows this enhanced contractual association relationship with 
dynamic development tools. The latter come to be seen as crucial in level-
ling the EU-Ukraine relationship, as has already been advocated by the 
Ukrainian party in its efforts to put the perspective of a customs union 
49 Decision No 3/2014 of the EU-Ukraine Association Council of 15 December 2014 on the 
delegation of certain powers by the Association Council to the Association Committee in 
Trade configuration [2015/980] OJ L158/4.
50 Decision No 1/2015 of the EU-Republic of Moldova Association Council of 18 Decem-
ber 2015 on the application of Title V of the Association Agreement between the European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, to the entire territory of the Republic 
of Moldova [2015/2445] OJ L336/93.
51 Council Decision (n 43).
52 Council Decision (n 44).
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between the EU and Ukraine on the table – not least in the framework of 
the most recent 2017 Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels.53 Future 
joint-institutional acts, adopted in the form of EU-Ukraine Association 
Council decisions on the (a) application, and/or (b) implementation of 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, will only further contribute to 
the advancement of this bilateral integration-by-association agenda fac-
ing multiple internal and external challenges, including the challenge of 
legal interpretation of the shared legal provisions and political interpreta-
tion of the agreement’s scope and teleological core. Already ahead of the 
November 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, it became indis-
pensable to dispel the myths about the EU-Ukraine Association Agree-
ment, then expected to be signed in the wake of this high-level event held 
biannually, which were spread mainly by the Russian media and offi-
cials, as well as channelled throughout Europe, let alone Ukraine, by the 
extensive Russian propaganda machinery. Štefan Füle, then European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, demolished 
many of the myths surrounding the public and political discourse of 
the EU-Ukrainian association deal, and the EEAS issued a memo paper 
thereon.54 Füle put it quite unequivocally: ‘We have been hearing a lot of 
myths recently about the impact of the AA/DCFTA: passing sovereignty 
to Brussels, costly exercise – absolute nonsense’.55 
To make (any) sense of what the deal in fact implies, one would in-
deed have to scrutinise the legal, political and economic virtue of the 
agreement’s content, which constitutes – along with being a source of the 
anchored formula of ‘political association and economic integration’ – a 
source of the association law per se, ie the legally binding framework for 
the establishment of a rules-based complex multi-layered normative or-
der. The innovative nature of this association law not only consists in the 
fact that it is the first Eastern Neighbourhood Association Agreement ever 
drafted, but – more importantly – in the very acknowledgement that this 
is a genuinely comprehensive deal containing ‘integration-oriented ele-
ments’, and thus allowing access to and a ‘stake in EU law’, to an extent 
similar to that of the European Economic Area. Secondly, the innovative-
ness is derived from the idea of an ‘FTA+’ (as it was initially called) or the 
‘DCFTA’ formula that is – for the first time – designed to be sufficiently 
53 ‘Poroshenko khoche chotyry soyuzy z Yevropoyu’ [Poroshenko Aims at Four Unions 
with Europe]. Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 24.11.2017 <https://dt.ua/POLITICS/poroshenko-hoche-
chotiri-soyuzi-z-yevropoyu-261276_.html> accessed 24 November 2017.
54 See, for instance, European External Action Service, ‘Myths about the EU-Ukraine Asso-
ciation Agreement – Setting the Facts Straight’ (23 May 2014) <http://eeas.europa.eu/delega-
tions/ukraine/documents/myths_aa_en.pdf> accessed 25 May 2015.
55 Štefan Füle, ‘EU-Ukraine: Dispelling the Myths about the Association Agreement’ 
(Speech at the International Conference ‘The Way Ahead for the Eastern Partnership’, Kyiv, 
11 October 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-808_en.htm> ac-
cessed 16 July 2014.
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flexible to allow the deep and comprehensive economic integration of 
Ukraine into the European Union’s internal market, ie to allow a ‘stake 
in the EU internal market’.
Innovatively enshrined in the treaty text itself, a kind of enhanced 
political association and economic integration formula can be derived 
through an analysis of the agreement content from two perspectives – 
political and economic: from the substantive provisions on the principles 
of association, political dialogue, free movement of goods, movement of 
workers, establishment and supply of cross-border services, to those on 
payments, capital, competition, and other economic provisions, energy 
cooperation as well as cooperation in other areas, as provided below. 
Assessing the content of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and 
revealing its meaning, including that of the specific concepts it introduces 
into EU-Ukraine relations, such as ‘association’ and ‘deep and compre-
hensive free trade area’, requires the interpretation of its wording against 
the teleological rationale of the agreement and contextual background of 
both the EU’s Ukraine policy and Ukraine’s European integration policy, 
including in the agreement’s post-signature stage. The 1966 statement of 
the International Law Commission holds that the ‘interpretation of docu-
ments is to some extent an art, not an exact science’.56 As such, it has to 
follow at least some principal general rules in order to be possibly similar 
and objectively ‘understandable the same way’ for both the parties of the 
treaties and the stakeholders, as well as interested third parties. Article 
31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out the gen-
eral rule for treaty interpretation which consists of: a) establishing the 
ordinary meaning of the terms implied, in their context and in the light of 
the treaty’s object and purpose derived from both the body text and the 
wording of the preamble, annexes, protocols, etc; b) establishing a special 
meaning of the terms implied, which can be invoked by a party (burden of 
proof of the special meaning is herewith presupposed).
Hence, the interpretation of international treaties requires a double 
approach – a ‘textual’ (or ‘literal’) approach that prescribes the examina-
tion of the content of the treaty, and an ‘effective’ (‘functional’ or ‘teleologi-
cal’) approach that gives no less weight to the supposed intentions of the 
parties, or the object and purpose of the treaty. The context should be 
taken into account in both cases, and it has to refer to both the events, 
acts and practices that preceded the conclusion of the agreement (pre-
56 Quoted after Antony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 205. 
For more on treaty interpretation cannons in legal scholarship, see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010); Ulf Linderfalk, On 
the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer 2007). 
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signature context) as well as those subsequent to its enactment and im-
plementation (post-signature context). In light of the aforementioned, the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement will have to be scrutinised herewith 
through its textual analysis, teleological and contextual analysis, fol-
lowed by a discourse analysis. The meaning of the ‘association’ concept, 
a tailor-made formula for relations between the European Union and 
Ukraine, as well as that of the ‘deep and comprehensive free trade agree-
ment’, constituting the second cornerstone of the association deal, will be 
explored and explained through an analysis of concept-relevant parts of 
the body text and the text of the annexes and protocols, including context 
and discourse, and will be mainly divided into two analytical parts: sub-
stantive provisions on ‘association’ and substantive provisions on ‘deep 
and comprehensive free trade area’ that are sought to correspond with 
the so-called political and economic dimension of the EU-Ukraine Asso-
ciation Agreement.
3.1 The teleology of the EU-Ukraine ‘association law’: an enhanced 
‘political association’ and ‘economic integration’
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement has been the first of the 
drafted ‘new generation’ association agreements of the European Union 
to establish a new and unique model of association explicitly based on two 
components – (enhanced) political association and (the most far-reaching) 
economic integration that has ever bound a third country with the Eu-
ropean Union. As remarked by the President of the European Council 
Herman van Rompuy,57 this agreement is ‘the most advanced agreement 
of its kind ever negotiated by the European Union’. Pointers to the ad-
vanced and innovative nature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
are self-entailed in the agreement’s body text itself, which sets out the 
framework for an enhanced association via constitutive principles, aims 
and features.
Articles 2 and 3 EU-Ukraine AA lay down the premises of the as-
sociation between the European Union and Ukraine, which is sought to 
be established on a twofold principles basis: democratic principles and 
principles of a free market economy. On the one hand, the essential con-
stituting elements of the association agreement are entailed according to 
article 2 EU-UA AA in respect of democratic principles, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, promotion of respect for the prin-
ciples of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and 
independence, as well as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, related materials and their means of delivery. On the other 
hand, progressive relationships between the EU and Ukraine, including 
57 H Van Rompuy, ‘Press Remarks by the President of the European Council following the 
EU-Ukraine Summit’ EUCO 48/13 (Brussels, 25 February 2013).
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the establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area within the 
innovative association formula, grant centrality to the principles of a free 
market economy that pursuant to article 3 EU-UA AA should underpin 
this bilateral relationship; these also include, along with the re-empha-
sised rule of law, the principles of good governance, the fight against 
corruption, the fight against different forms of trans-national organised 
crime and terrorism, and the promotion of sustainable development and 
effective multilateralism. 
Principled in this way, the association between the European Union 
and Ukraine aims at six objectives that constitute the teleological frame-
work of this ‘ambitious and innovative’ relationship, as follows:
Article 1. Objectives [emphasis added]:
1. An association between the Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and Ukraine, of the other part, is hereby established.
2. The aims of this association are:
a) to promote gradual rapprochement between the Parties based 
on common values and close and privileged links, and increas-
ing Ukraine’s association with EU policies and participation in 
programmes and agencies; 
b) to provide an appropriate framework for enhanced political dia-
logue in all areas of mutual interest; 
c) to promote, preserve and strengthen peace and stability in the 
regional and international dimensions in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, and of the Helsinki 
Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe and the objectives of the Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe of 1990; 
d) to establish conditions for enhanced economic and trade rela-
tions leading towards Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU 
Internal Market, including by setting up a Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area as stipulated in Title IV (Trade and 
Trade-related Matters) of this Agreement, and to support 
Ukrainian efforts to complete the transition into a functioning 
market economy by means of, inter alia, the progressive ap-
proximation of its legislation to that of the Union; 
e) to enhance cooperation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Se-
curity with the aim of reinforcing the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
f) to establish conditions for increasingly close cooperation in oth-
er areas of mutual interest. 
Interpretation of these provisions of article 1 EU-Ukraine AA, in light 
of the implicit purpose and explicit considerations that underpinned the 
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conclusion of this agreement, as expressis verbis enshrined in its pream-
ble, will allow us to decipher the EU-Ukrainian ‘association formula’58 as 
provided below.
3.2 Convergence-oriented participatory association: values, 
gradual rapprochement, increasingly close and open-ended 
relationship 
Based on the values that inspired the creation of the European Un-
ion itself and framed by a close and privileged relationship, the asso-
ciation between the EU and Ukraine is meant to bring about gradual 
rapprochement (up to genuine convergence) and increasing alignment 
of Ukrainian politics with the policies of the European Union, includ-
ing committal participation in their implementation via respective pro-
grammes and agencies. 
Given the overall politically conditional nature of the political asso-
ciation and economic integration of Ukraine with the European Union, 
which depends on progress in the implementation of the association 
agreement as well as ‘Ukraine’s track record in ensuring respect for com-
mon values, and progress in achieving convergence with EU in political, 
economic and legal areas’ (Preamble, indent 8 EU-UA AA), this associa-
tion is based on a regime of extended (and thus monitored and controlla-
ble) – rather than simply exported – values of the European Union. Article 
2 TEU determines that the Union is ‘founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ 
that ‘are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail’. Similarly, Ukraine and the EU are bound to be 
committed, via association links, to a ‘close and lasting relationship’ that 
is based on these values, namely ‘respect for democratic principles, the 
rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-dis-
crimination of persons belonging to minorities and respect for diversity, 
[and] human dignity’ (Preamble, indent 2 EU-UA AA). ‘Commitment to the 
principles of a free market economy, which would facilitate the participa-
tion of Ukraine in European policies’, which is added to the list of values 
within the same indent of the EU-Ukraine AA Preamble, as well as the an-
choring thereof under the general principles section, pinpoints the over-
arching and inseparable nature of the free market economy principles for 
58 In contrast to a widely (mis)perceived understanding of association in purely political 
terms, this article elaborates on the integral conception of ‘association’ that, in an integrative 
holistic way, encompasses ‘the political association and economic integration’ (as stipulated 
in indent 8 of the Preamble of the EU-Ukraine AA) of Ukraine with the European Union.
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the integrative association concept. A separate enlisting of the common 
values, such as democracy, respect for human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, and the rule of law (Preamble, indent 7 EU-UA AA), with 
the remark that these are the ‘essential elements’ of the agreement, may 
signify that their observance will be strictly monitored and subjected to 
the general suspension clause which grants the Council of the European 
Union (according to article 218 para 9 TFEU) the right to suspend the ap-
plication of an(y) association agreement in the case of a serious breach of 
its essential elements.
The ‘gradual rapprochement’ and ‘increasingly close relationship’ 
clauses – used throughout the agreement’s text body but also in a num-
ber of Council, Commission, and other EU institutional acts, along with 
the empowered institutional framework of the association59 – endow this 
bilateral deal with the capability of being adjusted and updated according 
to the state of the art in the EU-Ukrainian relationship. Consequently, 
they provide for flexibility and dynamism but also the durability and sta-
bility of this innovative contractual association. This finalité-open for-
mulation of both the substantive and strategic content of the association 
between the European Union and Ukraine is often lamented by policy 
makers, as well as by political scholarship, for being the agreement’s 
Achilles heel. This article considers such a substantive and strategic 
open-endedness, as anchored with the ‘gradual rapprochement’ and ‘in-
creasingly close relationship’ clauses, as both a compromised tribute to 
persistent non-favourable political constellations, and a distinctive ‘ena-
bler’ of, rather than a constraint to, a more ambitious stage of association 
relationship, including possible membership in the European Union. The 
interconnectedness and inter-determination of substantive and strategic 
open-endedness allow for the introduction of the strategic finalité, with 
a respective amendment to the substantive one, at a later stage of agree-
ment implementation, with lesser procedural pressure – provided that 
the necessary political will is developed.  
Therefore, notwithstanding a truly extensive substantive scope of 
economic integration that features the listed current (and also implied 
future) acquis, political association, in general, does not follow an 
exhaustive substantive rapprochement programme. Although the major 
scope for political association has been defined in the agreement, and 
includes enhanced political dialogue and convergence with EU policies in 
the domain of foreign and security policy as well as in the area of justice, 
freedom and security, no exhaustive and no restrictive agenda has been set 
therewith. In view of the unlimited duration of the EU-Ukraine Association 
59 See, for instance, Andriy Tyushka, ‘Empowered to Deliver: The Institutional Model and 
Implementation Arrangements under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’ (2015) 15(1) 
Romanian Journal of European Affairs 5.
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Agreement, a possible expansion of the substantive programme (in terms 
of both policy areas and scope of the policies themselves), ie a sort of 
substantive association ‘spillover’, is thereby conceived and envisaged. 
An empowered institutional framework of the EU-Ukraine association, 
which includes the Association Council, with its authority to issue legally 
binding decisions (pursuant to article 463 para 1 EU-UA AA), is sought 
to monitor the application and implementation of the agreement, as well 
as to review its functioning in light of its objectives (article 461 EU-UA 
AA). In doing so, the Association Council can detect further areas in 
which rapprochement would be necessary in pursuit of the association 
objectives – in particular, the objective of ‘establish[ing] conditions for 
increasingly close cooperation in other areas of mutual interest’ (article 
1 para 2(f) EU-UA AA), or suggest a deepening of the treaty-designated 
political association areas. 
Nor does the association follow a defined strategic rapprochement 
programme. The noncommittal formulation of the final objective in 
Ukraine’s gradual rapprochement with the European Union underpins 
the establishment of a bilateral relationship, which should be both special 
and privileged60 (as compared to other cooperative links of the EU with 
third countries), gradually evolving and – in an ‘ambitious and innovative 
way’ – ever closer to the Union, but – in its current conception – stopping 
short of full membership. However, no prejudice or rigidness encrusts this 
formula, which is why the open-endedness of the strategic rapproche-
ment programme should not be treated as a constraint to the ambitions of 
the parties per se. Indent 28 of the Preamble of the EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement makes it clear that ‘this Agreement will not prejudice and 
leaves open future developments in EU-Ukraine relations’. Furthermore, 
the ‘evolving relationship’ clause, anchored in the Preamble’s first indent, 
posits that a ‘close historical relationship and progressively closer links’ 
between the EU and Ukraine ‘as well as their desire to strengthen and 
widen relations in an ambitious and innovative way’ are given due ac-
count by the current association agreement. References in the agreement 
to Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ and the EU’s welcoming thereof,61 in con-
junction with the ‘noted’ European identity of Ukraine and acknowledged 
60 The ‘privileged relationship’ as established with the EU-Ukraine contractual association 
should be regarded as a status in flux since it may take different forms, ranging from little 
more than a free trade agreement to a level of integration which comes short of member-
ship, as axiomatically postulated in the so-called ‘Hallstein formula’. Although the initial 
scope of association depends indeed on the outcome of negotiations, the actual status of 
such a privileged relationship is thus to be monitored and updated in line with the progress 
of economic and political rapprochement between Ukraine and the European Union. For 
more on the formats of the privileged relationship between the EU and Ukraine, see Andriy 
Tyushka, Between Membership and Non-Membership in the European Union: Ukraine’s Ac-
tual and Potential Status (LAP  2010) especially 65-119.
61 EU-UA AA, Preamble, indents 5 and 6.
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commonness of values,62 denote that there are, in principle, no formal 
obstacles – in light of article 49 TEU63 – for upgrading the relationship 
to the membership level, provided that substantial obstacles (the miss-
ing political will) will have been overcome as well. This fait accompli can 
be detected and established through the envisaged comprehensive review 
procedure. Following article 481 para 1 EU-UA AA, the planned compre-
hensive review of the achievement of objectives will take place within five 
years of the agreement’s entry into force, ie by the end of 2022. The flex-
ibility of this clause, which stipulates that the objectives’ achievement 
review may take place earlier ‘at any other time by mutual consent of the 
Parties’ (article 481 para 1 EU-UA AA), lays down the premises for the 
even earlier possibility to upgrade the association goals to an ‘accession 
association’, and thus ultimately define the strategic finalité. The latter 
will have to be followed by a respective upgrade of the substantive rap-
prochement programme under the introduced accession association.
3.3 Instrumental association: political dialogues, convergence in 
FSP and AFSJ regulatory regimes
Convergence-oriented participatory association, broadly conceived 
as outlined in the previous section, presents an overarching framework 
for the attainment of the programmatic ‘political association and 
economic integration’ (Preamble, indent 8 EU-UA AA). The programme 
of ‘political association’ extends, over political dialogue, to convergence-
oriented reform policy and political alignment in manifold aspects of 
broader domains of foreign and security policy, as well as policy in the 
area of justice, freedom and security. Although not expressly defined by 
the agreement itself, political association, as an integral component of 
the EU-Ukraine association sensu largo, should not be misperceived as 
equalling political dialogue – the latter has its own objectives, including 
the deepening of political association (article 4 para 2(a) EU-UA AA). Nor 
does political association imply sole convergence in the field of foreign 
and security policy – the same article 4 para 2(a) EU-UA AA provides for 
‘political and security policy convergence and effectiveness’ as goals of 
political dialogue. Consequently, the dialogue should serve the broader 
aim of political association, with rapprochement in policy and governance 
styles, as well as participation in their advancement, as implied objectives. 
Such a conception endows, therefore, the very political association 
with both a passive (political convergence or alignment) and an active 
(effectiveness-oriented policy) mandate for the implementation of the 
defined EU policies. In addition to dialogue and cooperation on domestic 
62 ibid, indents 3 and 4.
63 Art 49 TEU, the ‘EU accession clause’, determines that: ‘Any European State which re-
spects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to 
become a member of the Union. […]’. 
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reforms, as stipulated in article 6 EU-UA AA (which should still be carried 
forward on the basis of the EU’s policy in the domain of the promotion of 
democracy and democratic institutions, as determined in article 14 EU-
UA AA64), the European Union policies mandated for alignment within the 
EU-Ukrainian political association include: foreign and security policy,65 
promotion of peace and international justice (cooperation on criminal 
matters),66 regional peace and stability,67 conflict prevention and crisis-
management policies, including military-technological cooperation,68 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,69 disarmament, arms 
controls, arms export control and the fight against illicit trafficking of 
arms,70 as well as the fight against terrorism.71 A broad conception of 
these policies under the political association mandate is dictated by the 
expressed ‘desir[e] of achieving an ever-closer convergence of positions 
on bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest, taking 
into account the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
European Union, including the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP)’ (Preamble, indent 12 EU-UA AA [emphasis added]). Although not 
listed within Title II of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, political 
association should also imply compliance (the next stage of convergence, 
an ‘enforceable convergence’ that is singled out in both the agreement’s 
chapter on ‘trade-related energy’ and the external regulatory framework – 
the Energy Community Treaty, EnCT) with EU energy policies, including 
the energy security policy that has a direct link to regional peace and 
stability. As expressed in the agreement’s preamble, the EU and Ukraine 
are committed, under association links, to 
enhancing energy security, facilitating the development of appropri-
ate infrastructure and increasing market integration and regulatory 
approximation towards key elements of the EU acquis, promoting 
energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources as well 
as achieving a high level of nuclear safety and security (Preamble, 
indent 20 EU-UA AA). 
64 In view of the fact that Title II of the EU-Ukraine AA (entitled ‘Political Dialogue and 
Reform, Political Association, Cooperation and Convergence in the Field of Foreign and Se-
curity Policy’) entails cross-references to the next Title III ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, 
it is reasonable to argue that the notion of ‘political association’ is not constrained by sole 
convergence in the field of foreign and security policy (as often mistakenly characterised), 
but encompasses wider policy alignment areas, including rapprochement in the governance 
styles themselves.
65 EU-UA AA, art 7.
66 ibid, art 8.
67 ibid, art 9.
68 ibid, art 10.
69 ibid, art 11.
70 ibid, art 12.
71 ibid, art 13.
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In light of further commitments under the EU-Ukraine association 
– including the commitment ‘to increasing dialogue […] and cooperation 
on migration, asylum and border management, with a comprehensive ap-
proach paying attention to legal migration and to cooperating in tackling 
illegal immigration, and trafficking in human beings, and ensuring the 
efficient implementation of the readmission agreement’ (Preamble, indent 
21 EU-UA AA) – and the recognised importance of mobility of persons (as 
per Preamble, indent 22 EU-UA AA) – the notion of political association 
will have to inevitably include policy domains that have not been listed 
under Title II of the EU-Ukraine AA. It would certainly be wrong to exclude 
from the political association scope further policy areas that are singled 
out under the separate title of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (Ti-
tle III ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’), such as: migration, asylum and 
border management policy,72 including the liberalisation of the movement 
of persons73 and employed persons (workers),74 money laundering and ter-
rorism financing,75 the fight against illicit drugs,76 crime and corruption,77 
terrorism,78 as well as judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters.79 
These policies fall under the distinct regulatory regime within the EU gov-
ernance system, and thus also enjoy a different status and regulatory 
framework under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, including the 
special opt-out regimes for some of the EU Member States. They will nev-
ertheless constitute an integral substantive scope of political association 
between the European Union and Ukraine, since enhanced cooperation 
‘in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security with the aim of reinforcing 
the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ 
(article 1 para 2(e) EU-UA AA) is defined as one of the six association aims. 
It should be noted, however, that the convergence-oriented provisions of 
political association in this field, ie the area of justice, freedom and secu-
rity, as well as those of the domain of foreign and security policy, are un-
able to directly establish specific rights or obligations for individuals and 
legal entities, wherefore they cannot be directly applicable and enforced 
under the agreement itself. Compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
will be offered, however, through separate international legal and political 
frameworks, such as agreements or arrangements that have already been 
concluded and will be concluded within the scope of enhanced political 
association between Ukraine, the EU and its Member States. 
72 ibid, art 16.
73 ibid, art 19.
74 ibid, arts 17 and 18.
75 ibid, art 20.
76 ibid, art 21.
77 ibid, art 22.
78 ibid, art 23.
79 ibid, art 24.
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The new bilateral relationship, established with EU-Ukraine political 
association links, is therefore sought to trigger enhanced convergence-
oriented participatory cooperation (up to alignment) in the implementa-
tion of various EU policies within the aforementioned CFSP and AFSJ 
governance regimes, in addition to the well-articulated economic integra-
tion realm. Being in its essence policy-oriented, the political association 
will be achieved inter alia by way of deploying an enhanced political dia-
logue, which in turn is based on the general association rationale. The 
inextricability of causal relationships between association and political 
dialogue provides for a twofold interpretation of political association: on 
the one hand, such a policy-oriented association will be achieved through 
enhanced political dialogue (political association as a desired outcome of 
the dialogue) whereas, on the other hand, the association framework con-
stitutes a prerequisite for political dialogue and its extensive regulatory 
mechanism (association as the premise for the dialogue).80 
Political dialogue, as laid down by the EU-Ukraine Association Agree-
ment, will ‘promote gradual convergence on foreign and security matters 
with the aim of Ukraine’s ever-deeper involvement in the European se-
curity area’ and cover ‘all areas of mutual interest [that] shall be further 
developed and strengthened between the Parties’ (article 4 para 1 EU-UA 
AA). Thereby one should not be misled by a narrow reading of the ‘Euro-
pean security area’ as if implying an exclusively external or foreign secu-
rity domain. The European security area encompasses an environment 
‘of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects 
of security are indissolubly linked’,81 as defined in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy. As a result, both external security issues covered by 
the CFSP governance regime (such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, re-
gional conflicts), and internal security issues addressed within the AFSJ 
governance regime (state failure, including bad governance, corruption, 
abuse of power, weak democratic institutions and lack of accountability, 
along with organised crime) present threats to European security.82 The 
EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy binds the Union moreover to ‘con-
solidate a security model, based on the principles and values of the Un-
ion: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, 
80 Against this backdrop but also including further arguments as provided above, this 
article contends that ‘association’ and ‘political association’ should be treated as distinct 
(but not diverging) concepts, with the subordination relationship in which ‘association’ is a 
broader concept with political, legal and economic features that encompasses two subordi-
nated notions – those of ‘political association’ and ‘economic integration’.
81 Council of the European Union, ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a 
Better World’ (2003) 2  <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publica-
tions/2009/pdf/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world/> accessed 22 
June 2015.
82 ibid, 3-5.
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democracy, dialogue, tolerance, transparency and solidarity’.83 A broad 
reading of the ‘European security area’ as a domain for Ukraine’s ‘ever-
deeper involvement’ (article 4 para 1 EU-UA AA) under the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement is therefore a key to comprehending the ‘political 
association’ concept and the implied internal-external security nexus as 
the domain for an enhanced political dialogue between the European Un-
ion and Ukraine. The objectives of political dialogue as listed in article 4 
para 2 EU-UA AA make it clear that both internal and external security 
policies of the European Union are covered by the convergence and align-
ment mandate as set up under political association, since the political 
dialogue aims:
(a) to deepen political association and increase political and secu-
rity policy convergence and effectiveness; (b) to promote interna-
tional stability and security based on effective multilateralism; (c) 
to strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Parties on in-
ternational security and crisis management, particularly in order to 
address global and regional challenges and key threats; (d) to fos-
ter result-oriented and practical cooperation between the Parties for 
achieving peace, security and stability on the European continent; 
(e) to strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law 
and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, 
non-discrimination of persons belonging to minorities and respect 
for diversity, and to contribute to consolidating domestic political 
reforms; (f) to develop dialogue and to deepen cooperation between 
the Parties in the field of security and defence; (g) to promote the 
principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the 
inviolability of borders (article 4 para 2 EU-UA AA). 
In order to achieve those aims, political dialogue should be conduct-
ed at distinct levels and on both a regular and permanent basis. Article 6 
EU-UA AA defines the eligible fora for the conduct of political dialogue, in-
cluding a regular, ad hoc, and permanent basis. Regular frameworks include 
(a) meetings at Summit level (article 5 para 1 EU-UA AA), (b) meetings 
between representatives of the Parties at Foreign Minister level (article 5 
para 2 EU-UA AA), (c) meetings at Political Directors, Political and Secu-
rity Committee and expert level, including on specific regions and issues, 
between representatives of the European Union on the one hand, and rep-
resentatives of Ukraine on the other (article 5 para 3(a) EU-UA AA), as well 
as (d) meetings both at the level of high officials and of experts of the mili-
tary institutions of the Parties (article 5 para 3(c) EU-UA AA). Permanent 
83 Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European 
Union: Towards a European Security Model’ 5842/2/10 (Brussels, 23 February 2010) 8 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%205842%202010%20REV%20
2> accessed 22 June 2015.
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political dialogue should be conducted (a) at ministerial level, within the 
Association Council format (article 5 para 2 EU-UA AA), and (b) at par-
liamentary level, within the Parliamentary Association Committee (article 
5 para 5 EU-UA AA). Occasionally, political dialogue will be pursued on 
an ad hoc basis through (a) ‘all diplomatic and military channels between 
the Parties, including appropriate contacts in third countries and within 
the United Nations, the OSCE and other international fora’ (article 5 para 
3(b) EU-UA AA), (b) any other means, including expert-level meetings 
(article 5 para 3(d) EU-UA AA), and (c) other procedures and mechanisms 
for political dialogue, including extraordinary consultations (article 5 para 4 
EU-UA AA). The aforementioned allows it to be argued that the envisaged 
political association, as broadly scoped by the EU policies in the field of 
foreign and security policy as well as in the area of freedom, security and 
justice, will be achieved via extensive monitoring and regulatory institu-
tional mechanisms.
3.4 Integration-oriented association: the DCFTA, a stake in the EU 
internal market and a stake in EU law 
Instrumental and programmatically convergence-oriented in the 
realm of political association, the EU-Ukraine contractual association also 
yields a stronger integration-oriented magnitude. Desirous of ‘contributing 
to the gradual economic integration’ (Preamble, indent 14 EU-UA AA), the 
Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine defines, 
as one of the association goals, the establishment of conditions for ‘en-
hanced economic and trade relations leading towards Ukraine’s gradual 
integration in the EU Internal Market, including by setting up a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ (article 1 para 2(d) EU-UA AA). This 
treaty passage entails two significant implications. First, it denotes that 
the envisaged economic integration between the EU and Ukraine is much 
broader in scope than the DCFTA alone – it actually includes the latter 
among other essentials for gradual economic integration, not least legis-
lative and regulatory approximation.84 Indent 17 of the Preamble to the 
EU-Ukraine AA recognises the necessity of ‘the broader process of legis-
lative approximation’ that, being linked to the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area, ‘will contribute to further economic integration with the 
European Union Internal Market’. Second, the EU-Ukraine association 
model explicitly aims at Ukraine’s gradual integration in the Union’s In-
ternal Market that is remarkable in a number of ways: first, as an ambi-
tious and comprehensive economic integration commitment commensu-
rate, for instance, with that of the European Economic Area; second, as 
84 Indent 16 of the Preamble to the EU-Ukraine AA enlists – in a non-exclusive way – at 
least three elements that should facilitate the achievement of the envisaged ‘economic inte-
gration’: (1) a DCFTA; (2) the WTO regulatory regime; and (3) extensive regulatory approxi-
mation between the EU and Ukraine.
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an innovative integration commitment if compared to other association 
deals of the EU with both the near and wider neighbourhood;85 and, final-
ly, as a complex integration mechanism, built on the concepts of ‘enhanced 
economic and trade relations’ and ‘economic integration’ while designed 
to be driven by the implied gears of gradual legislative and regulatory ap-
proximation (harmonisation of law and procedural politics) – all meant to 
facilitate Ukraine’s aimed gradual integration in the EU Internal Market.
The significance of these association elements lies in their genuinely 
integrative nature. In his study of bilateral association agreements of the 
EU with third countries, Maresceau called them ‘integration oriented ele-
ments’86 which, in turn, gave birth to the concept of ‘integration-oriented 
agreements’ (‘les accords d’intégration’) coined by the same author87 to 
designate the Union’s association agreements with the countries of its 
proximity. Implying economic integration, legislative and regulatory ap-
proximation, as well as ‘convergence with the EU in political, economic 
and legal areas’ (as explicitly stated in indent 8 of the Preamble to the 
EU-UA AA), the Association Agreement between the European Union and 
Ukraine, as one of the so-called ‘integration-oriented agreements’, envis-
ages the obligatory observance of the Union’s principles and values, as 
well as EU law-conform interpretation of the substantive association law. 
These premises lead to a quasi-amalgamation not only of economic but 
also of legal orders, and thus to a legal fiction88 of Ukraine being part 
85 Comparing the provision of article 1 para 2(d) EU-Ukraine AA to similar stipulations of the 
EU’s association agreements with the Mediterranean states (EMAAs) and even pre-accession 
association agreements with the Western Balkans states (SAAs), Van der Loo et al highlight 
the remarkability of Ukraine’s ‘economic integration’ clause that innovatively extends be-
yond the ‘conventional’ establishment of a free trade area or the gradual liberalisation of 
trade in goods, services and capital as targeted by the latter two groups of EU agreements. 
See Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege and Roman Petrov, ‘The EU-Ukraine Asso-
ciation Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument’ (2014) EUI Working Pa-
per LAW 2014/09, 1-2 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32031/LAW%20_
WP_2014_9%20.pdf> accessed 16 February 2015. 
86 Marc Maresceau, ‘Integration Oriented Elements in Bilateral Agreements Concluded by 
the EU with Third States: A Few Examples’ (Speech delivered at the book launch seminar ‘Inte-
gration and Differentiation in the European Union: A Legal Approach’ Nicosia 24 June 2010) 
<www.europarl.cy/ressource/static/files/ADDRESS_PROF_MARESCEAU_20100624.pdf> 
accessed 16 July 2013.
87 Marc Maresceau, ‘Les accords d’intégration dans les relations de proximité de l’Union 
européenne’ in Claude Baumann (ed), Les frontières de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2013).
88 Legal fiction is a rule employed in judicial reasoning to avoid difficulties in the opera-
tion of law assuming that something is true even if it may be not. A very concise functional 
definition of legal fiction can be found in Canadian Justice Scarth’s reasoning in the case 
Staufen v BC 2001 BCSC 779: ‘(A) legal fiction is an assertion accepted as true (though 
probably fictitious) to achieve a useful purpose, especially in legal matters’. See Staufen v 
British Columbia (Attorney General) 2001 BCSC 779 (CanLII) <http://canlii.ca/t/4xcm> ac-
cessed 2 August 2014. Legal fictions bear real judicial (reasoning by Courts) but also politi-
cal (state domestic and international politics) consequences. On the real consequences of 
the legal fiction in diplomatic protection, see Vermeer- Annemarieke Künzli, ‘As If: The Legal 
117CYELP 13 [2017] 87-132
of the Union’s legal system. Such a ‘stake in EU law’ as created by this 
legal fiction will become palpable through the practice of the application 
and obligatory interpretation of the agreement’s provisions (principles, 
values, concepts, norms) in conformity with European Union law, both 
(a) the existing and (sic!) future acquis, and (b) treaty-based law, as well 
as law developed in the process of the ECJ’s adjudication. This is due to 
the dictum of ensuring uniform interpretation and application of the EU 
acquis in the European Union’s external agreements, especially those 
that establish contractual association.89 Remarkably, in the context of 
the EU-Ukraine association, such a judicial dimension of relationship 
had to be observed also in the Ukrainian legal system. Furthermore, the 
reciprocity effects of the stake in EU law granted to Ukraine had been 
observable even at the agreement’s provisional – not full – application 
mode from 2014/2016 until late 2017. Petrov and Kalinichenko90 em-
phasise that the Constitutional Court of Ukraine endeavours to interpret 
the provisions of the national Constitution in line with international and 
European legal standards by applying the EU acquis as a persuasive 
source of law. In addition, Ukrainian administrative courts appear to jus-
tify the application of ECJ case law, as evidenced in their adjudication 
from the agreement pre-signature times. In Person v Kyiv City Centre for 
Social Assistance,91 the Kyiv District Administrative District imported the 
principles of legal certainty from EU law and referred, in its ruling on the 
case, to the ECJ’s judgment in van Duyn v Home Office.92
By providing for the modality of stake in the EU internal market and 
inevitably enabling at the same time a stake in the Union’s law, the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement presents, to use the wording of Van der 
Loo et al, ‘an exceptional phenomenon in the practice of the EU’s exter-
nal action’,93 attributable to the European Common Aviation Area Agree-
ment (ECAA) and the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT), along with the 
Fiction in Diplomatic Protection’ (2007) 18(1) European Journal of International Law 37. 
For a general legal theoretic analysis of legal fictions, see: Nancy J Knauer, ‘Legal Fictions 
and Juristic Truth’ (2010) 23(1) St. Thomas Law Review 1; Maksymilian Del Mar, ‘Legal Fic-
tions and Legal Change’ (2013) 9(4) International Journal of Law in Context 442; Michael 
Quinn, ‘Fuller on Legal Fictions: A Benthamic Perspective’ (2013) 9(4) International Journal 
of Law in Context 466; Karen Petroski, ‘Legal Fictions and the Limits of Legal Language’ (2013) 
9(4)  International Journal of Law in Context 485.
89 Guillaume Van der Loo, ‘The EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: A 
Coherent Mechanism for Legislative Approximation?’ in Peter Van Elsuwege and Roman 
Petrov (eds), Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbour-
hood of the European Union: Towards a Common Regulatory Space? (Routledge, 2014) 68-70.
90 Roman Petrov and Paul Kalinichenko, ‘The Europeanization of Third Country Judiciaries 
through the Application of the EU Acquis: The Cases of Russia and Ukraine’ (2011) (60(2) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 325, 325.
91 Judgment of the District Administrative Court of Kiev on 26 June 2008, No 4/337.
92 Case C-41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office ECLI:EU:C:1974:133.
93 Van der Loo et al (n 85) 2.
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well-known example of the European Economic Area (EEA). Equipped 
with the integration-oriented elements akin to those contained in these 
agreements, the EU-Ukraine association deal presents a legal instru-
ment for the establishment of an ‘association-cum-integration’94 model, 
or ‘integration through association’,95 to use Hillion’s wording. Naturally, 
economic integration, with the DCFTA as its axial component, lies at 
the heart of this phenomenon. Thereby, association law, including the 
DCFTA’s substantial and procedural law, presents an institution, which 
is sought to both enable and enforce the envisaged integration process.
The integration process within the EU-Ukrainian contractual associ-
ation will mainly be carried out within the scope of the Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area, accompanied by the processes of legislative and 
regulatory approximation that will eventually lead to the desired economic 
integration. Two crucial elements of new generation free trade areas, from 
their inception in the EU-Ukraine association deal, need to be explained 
herewith, namely the concept-determining notions of ‘comprehensive-
ness’ and ‘depth’. A ‘comprehensive’ FTA encompasses both liberalisa-
tion of trade in goods and services, covering – in the case of goods – even 
‘sensitive’ goods such as agricultural, steel and textile products. Hence, 
it stands for a scope of liberalisation that, in the case of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement, substantially goes beyond classical or conven-
tional FTAs. A ‘deep’ FTA refers to the inextricable and significant role 
of the regulatory approximation instrument. Whereas in classical free 
trade areas, legislative approximation is sufficient to safeguard the free 
flow of goods across borders (reduction or abolition of tariffs, ie technical 
barriers to trade), the deep and comprehensive free trade areas require 
outreach and regulatory tools to make sure that the free trade in goods 
and services is not constrained as well ‘beyond borders’, for instance, 
via non-technical barriers to trade. There is no way in which further 
‘economic integration’ and a ‘stake in the EU internal market’, both de-
clared as objectives in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, could be 
achieved without ensuring – along with the legislative approximation and 
standards harmonisation – effective regulatory approximation and uni-
form interpretation of the agreement stipulations. Unlike traditional free 
trade areas (FTAs), deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTAs) go 
therefore much further in regulating the liberalisation of trade, but also 
in stipulating harmonisation of legislation and – what is essentially sig-
nificant – the regulatory practices of norms implementation. It is not only 
tariff-free mutual market access for goods which is to be granted thereby, 
94 This concept essentially draws on the related notions of ‘enhanced association’ or ‘as-
sociation plus’, as advanced by earlier accounts of the current author. See Tyushka (n 60).
95 Christophe Hillion, ‘Integrating an Outsider: An EU Perspective on Relations with Norway’ 
(2011) Europautredningen, Rapport 16 (August 2011) 9 <www.europautredningen.no/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2011/04/Rap16-EØS-sett-fra-EU.pdf> accessed 12 July 2015.
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but also non-tariff barriers to free trade in goods and services, as well as 
to free movement of capital and (to a certain extent) persons, that have to 
be abolished under enhanced association agreements, drafted after the 
EU-Ukraine accord template.
Access to, and a stake in, the European Union internal market, sub-
stantively granted via the DCFTA, will become feasible for the Ukrainian 
economy and citizenry mainly due to the enabled four market freedoms, 
in addition to economic and regulatory convergence in a number of sec-
tors, including energy. It should be noted, however, that, unlike in the 
case of the EU’s internal market, the four freedoms to be granted under 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement are rather constrained in scope, 
each to a different extent, with the only exception being for the free move-
ment of goods. The movement of services, payments and capital, as well 
as the movement of Ukrainian workers legally employed in the territory of 
an EU Member State, are subject to certain conditions, while relying on 
the principles and rules which guide the functioning of the Union’s own 
internal market.96 
3.4.1 Free movement of goods
The implementation of the free movement of goods requires that 
the parties to the DCFTA, the European Union, and Ukraine abolish all 
measures constituting a barrier to trade within the envisaged free trade 
area. In contrast to the Europe Agreements concluded by the EU with the 
CEECs in the early 1990s, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement – akin 
to the EEA Agreement97 – aims at the abolition of both technical98 and 
non-technical99 barriers to the free movement of goods and provision of 
services100 within the DCFTA. The movement of persons and capital is, 
however, still subjected more to restrictions than the freedoms it is ena-
bled to enjoy. Consequently, it would make sense to refer to free move-
ment only with regard to trade in goods.
The free trade area, which pursuant to article 25 EU-UA AA has 
to be established over a transitional period of a maximum of 10 years 
starting from the entry into force of the agreement (hereby, a date when 
the Association Agreement starts to be provisionally applied should be 
96 Tyushka (n 29) 52-53.
97 Called by Marc Maresceau (n 86) ‘a real intellectual master-piece of legal thinking on 
integration’, in view of the fact that the EEA Agreement ‘not only identified a very large part 
of the substantive EU acquis including the four freedoms, competition law, horizontal and 
flanking policies to be applied in the EFTA countries but also provided a sophisticated in-
stitutional framework to guarantee homogeneity in interpretation and application’ 3.
98 EU-UA AA, arts 53-58.
99 ibid, arts 25-39, and especially arts 34 and 35.
100 ibid, art 94.
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understood), will eventually result in the elimination of customs duties, 
fees and other charges,101 export subsidies and equivalent measures,102 
other technical barriers to trade,103 as well as non-tariff measures.104 
The principle of non-discrimination, anchored in the ‘national treatment’ 
formula,105 will facilitate the strict observance of discrimination prohibi-
tion, one of the foundational principles of the EU’s internal market. A 
‘standstill’ clause, as stipulated in article 30 EU-UA AA, will prevent any 
deliberation on the part of either the European Union or Ukraine as re-
gards introducing any new customs duty or increasing an existing one, 
even if this is the case for a party’s trade with non-DCFTA partners. 
The scope of the free trade in goods seems, however, to be narrower 
than that within the Union’s internal market, for two reasons. First, the 
DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine will only cover goods ‘originating in 
the territories of the Parties’ (article 26(1) EU-UA AA). In the EU’s internal 
101 ibid, art 27.
102 ibid, art 32.
103 ibid, arts 53-58.
104 Art 35 EU-UA AA stipulates: ‘No Party shall adopt or maintain any prohibition or re-
striction or any measure having an equivalent effect on the import of any good of the other 
Party or on the export or sale for export of any good destined for the territory of the other 
Party, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or in accordance with Article XI of 
GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes. […]’. The rationale of the article is derived from the 
ECJ’s case law applicable in the EU legal order that – pursuant to the EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement – will also be applicable in the framework of the EU-Ukrainian contractual 
association, due to the anchored therewith imperative of EU law-conform interpretation 
of the treaty stipulations. In addition to the general prohibition of tariff and quantitative 
restrictions, the European Court of Justice has developed a formula of ancillary prohibition 
of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (MEQR) that are capable of 
impeding free trade. In its Dassonville judgment, the ECJ held in 1974 that ‘[a]ll trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Community trade, are to be considered as measures having an equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions’. See Case 8/74 Dassonville ECLI:EU:C:1974:82, para 5. 
The Dassonville-posterior development of EU case law and legislation contributed to the 
extension of the MEQR normative scope, now embracing, for instance, technical regulations 
and selling arrangements of sorts – in addition to the originally understood ‘trading rules’. 
See, for instance, an overview by the Commission’s Enterprise and Industry DG: Commis-
sion, ‘Free Movement of Goods: Guide to the Application of Treaty Provisions Governing the 
Free Movement of Goods’ Ares(2013)3759436 (18 December 2013).
105 Art 34 EU-UA AA: ‘Each Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of the other 
Party […]’. This ‘national treatment’ clause is significant in view of the possible and, in prin-
ciple, justifiable protectionist policies that, as a matter of principle, are legally not permis-
sible under the DCFTA. It is clear that the most obvious form of protectionism will occur 
not through customs duties or charges themselves, but through customs duties or charges 
which have an equivalent effect, with the object of rendering foreign goods more expensive 
than their domestic counterparts. In this regard, national treatment formula, in conjunc-
tion with the prohibition of non-tariff barriers to trade, will eliminate such possibilities for 
protectionism by either Ukrainian or European Union economies. In addition, the substan-
tive provisions of arts 59 to 74 EU-UA AA on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) will 
facilitate free trade in commodities which are covered by these measures and which have to 
be harmonised between the EU and Ukraine to ensure their non-discriminatory application.
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market based on the customs union, freedom of movement applies not 
only to goods originating in Member States, but also to products coming 
from third countries which are in ‘free circulation’ in Member States (ar-
ticle 28(2) TFEU). Hence, products from third countries are also in free 
circulation once inside the Union, which certainly extends the scope and 
coverage of trade in goods as only based on the ‘rules of origin’ principle, 
applicable within the EU-Ukraine AA. Second, the definition of ‘goods’ 
itself is narrower. The footnote to article 26(1) EU-UA AA stipulates that, 
for the purposes of the agreement, ‘goods’ means ‘products as understood 
in GATT 1994 unless otherwise provided in this Agreement’. Within the 
EU’s internal market, there is a free circulation of the ‘goods’, which – in 
their definitional scope – extend beyond a common, GATT-derived under-
standing. The European Court of Justice has defined ‘goods’ as ‘products 
which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of form-
ing the subject of commercial transactions’.106 Consequently, the rules on 
free movement of goods are applicable within the EU’s internal market to 
articles of artistic, historic, archaeological or ethnographic value, as well 
as, for instance, to non-recyclable waste.107
Importantly, the treaty provides enforcement mechanisms for en-
suring the observance of free trade in goods between the parties. Trade 
remedies defined in articles 40 to 52 EU-UA AA include both interna-
tional safeguard measures (under the GATT and WTO frameworks) and 
agreement-specific measures and mechanisms (such as anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures,108 consultations,109 and dialogue on trade 
remedies110 in the form of a permanent forum for cooperation in trade 
remedies matters). Thereby, the dispute settlement mechanism, as de-
fined in Chapter 14 of Title IV of the EU-Ukraine AA, is not applicable 
within the trade remedies framework. 
3.4.2 (Rights to free) movement of persons, establishment, supply of 
services and e-commerce
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement chapters on the movement of 
workers, establishment and supply of services,111 an inseparable part of 
the so-called ‘human dimension’ of the association, constitute a stumbling 
106 Case 7/68 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:1968:51, para 428. 
107 Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:1992:310, paras 23-28.
108 EU-UA AA, arts 46-50.
109 ibid, art 50.
110 ibid, art 51.
111 See Chapter 6 ‘Establishment, trade in services and electronic commerce’ (arts 85-96), 
Chapter 7 ‘Current payments and movement of capital’ of Title IV of the EU-UA AA. On 
movement of persons, see Section 4 ‘Temporary presence of natural persons for business 
purposes’ and Sub-section 2 of Section 5 ‘Regulatory framework’ of Chapter 6 pertaining to 
Title IV, along with arts 17-19 located in Title III of the EU-UA AA.
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block in the implementation of the agreement’s objectives. The free move-
ment of persons is one of the four fundamental freedoms in the Europe-
an Union internal market. The movement of persons (Ukraine’s citizens) 
and employed persons (workers) under the EU-Ukraine AA is apparently 
not commensurate with the freedom of movement as established by the 
EU treaties or even the EEA treaty. This will be distinguished between 
three kinds of freedoms granted under this ‘human dimension’ of the EU-
Ukrainian association, namely the (liberalised, but not unconditionally 
free) movement of employed persons (workers), the self-employed and of 
companies (establishment and services, including e-commerce), and the 
general movement of persons not covered by the previous two categories 
(Ukraine’s citizens who are not yet legally employed on the territory of an 
EU Member State, and neither are they part of the personnel of a compa-
ny that operates business with outreach to the EU’s internal market, nor 
self-employed persons or persons running an e-commerce business). The 
movement of so-called ‘economic operators’ (workers, the self-employed 
and of companies, including establishment regulations) and ‘ordinary’ 
citizens (persons) is ruled out by the EU-Ukraine AA provisions falling 
both under the scope of the DCFTA’s trade and trade-related matters (ie 
within the same-titled Title IV) and Title III ‘Justice, Freedom and Securi-
ty’. Inclusion of the provisions on the movement of persons and employed 
persons (workers) within Title III has been apparently conditioned by the 
special regime of this policy within the EU itself, with Denmark, the UK 
and Ireland enjoying the opt-out rights therein. Therefore, it makes sense 
to speak of (conditional) rights to free movement, rather than free move-
ment as such, granted by virtue of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement to 
Ukrainian citizens, both qualifying for workers or self-employed catego-
ries of persons, or persons other than those.
In the EU’s internal market, even persons other than workers or 
self-employed persons having the nationality of a Member State enjoy the 
advantages of free movement.112 In the ‘best endeavour’ clause manner, 
article 19 paras 2 and 3 of the EU-Ukraine AA expressly attaches the 
‘freedom’ of movement of persons other than workers of self-employed 
persons to the establishment of a visa-free regime: 
The Parties shall also endeavour to enhance the mobility of citizens and 
to make further progress on the visa dialogue. 
112 The ECJ’s case law and EC/EU legislation has extended enjoyment of certain rights 
to (1) members of the families of employed persons, (2) self-employed persons, and (3) 
other persons on whom the EU law confers a right of residence, regardless of their nation-
ality. See, respectively, Case 40/76 Kermaschek v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1976] ECR 
1669, para 9; Directive 68/360; Regulation no 1612/68; Regulation no 1251/70; Directive 
73/148 and Directive 75/34, since replaced by Directive 2004/38.  
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The Parties shall take gradual steps towards a visa-free regime in 
due course, provided that the conditions for well-managed and se-
cure mobility, set out in the two-phase Action Plan on Visa Liberali-
zation presented at the EU-Ukraine Summit of 22 November 2010, 
are in place (article 19 paras 2 and 3 EU-UA AA).
Consequently, the freedom of movement of Ukrainian citizens has 
not been granted by default through the association agreement itself, but 
was made dependent on the visa regime liberalisation. It was only in May 
2017 that the Council granted visa-free travel to Ukrainian citizens, ef-
fective as of 11 June 2017.113
Neither does the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement establish the 
right of access to the European Union’s labour market – it only grants a 
right to equal treatment114 to workers that are (already) legally employed 
in the territory of a Member State. The provision on non-discrimination 
of workers as laid down by article 17 EU-UA AA is reciprocal, ie it also 
obliges Ukraine to accord equal treatment to EU nationals that are al-
ready employed in Ukraine:
Article 17. Treatment of workers
1. Subject to the laws, conditions and procedures applicable in the 
Member States and the EU, treatment accorded to workers who are 
Ukrainian nationals and who are legally employed in the territory 
of a Member State shall be free of any discrimination based on na-
tionality as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, 
compared to the nationals of that Member State. 
2. Ukraine shall, subject to the laws, conditions and procedures in 
Ukraine, accord the treatment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Arti-
cle to workers who are nationals of a Member State and who are legally 
employed in its territory.
Excluding social security matters for certain reasons, this non-
discrimination rule is only applicable to the workers’ working conditions, 
remuneration or dismissal, as exhaustively listed in article 17 para 1 
EU-UA AA. There exists, however, room for action for the EU-Ukraine 
Association Council that can, similar to the EC-Turkey Association Council, 
develop workers’ rights, including the provision of access to social security 
113 Regulation (EU) 2017/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 
2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nation-
als are exempt from that requirement (Ukraine) [2017] OJ L133/1.  
114 A distinction between ‘access to employment’ and ‘treatment in employment’ in the con-
text of third-country nationals’ rights within the EU internal market was clearly drawn by Ad-
vocate General FG Jacobs. See Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer ECLI:EU:C:2001:474, 
Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, para 43.
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systems, by their agreement-implementing decisions. The respective 
‘enabler’, ie the treaty-based authorisation of the Association Council, is 
contained in article 18 para 2 EU-UA AA: 
The Association Council shall examine the granting of other more 
favourable provisions in additional areas, including facilities for ac-
cess to professional training, in accordance with laws, conditions 
and procedures in force in the Member States and in the EU, and 
taking into account the labour market situation in the Member 
States and in the EU’ (article 18 para 2 EU-UA AA).
It should be emphasised that the general equal treatment provi-
sion (or discrimination prohibiting provision) as per article 17 of the EU-
Ukraine AA is directly applicable to working conditions, remuneration 
and dismissal for legally employed workers and thus can, in principle, 
be directly invoked (enforced) by the affected individuals in front of the 
national courts within the EU and Ukrainian judiciary systems.115 In the 
case of the European Union, the precedent was set by the ECJ in Pokrzep-
towicz-Meyer116 and developed later in Deutscher Handballbund.117 In the 
latter case, the European Court of Justice did not interpret the prohi-
bition to discriminate restrictively against legally employed ‘associated 
workers’ and therewith fully extended the rights for equal treatment (ap-
plicable to workers from the EU Member States within the Union’s inter-
nal market) to market-present workers from associated countries. As a 
115 In light of arts 5 and 3 of the respective Council Decisions (n 43) and (n 44) on the 
conclusion of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the direct effect of the association 
agreement provisions seems to have been explicitly precluded, for both provisions are firm 
in their statement that ‘[t]he Agreement shall not be construed as conferring rights or im-
posing obligations which can be directly invoked before Union or Member States courts or 
tribunals’. The issue of the explicitly precluded direct effect of EU-Ukraine association law 
is, however, less straightforward than it first appears. Direct effect, as known in EU law, 
is a political and a legal question at the same time. In its political dimension, the issue of 
direct effect can be positively or negatively settled by the signatory parties to the agreement 
themselves, as pointed out in the judgment in Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupfer-
berg & Cie ECLI:EU:C:1982:362. The aforementioned Council Decisions on the conclusion 
of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement exemplify the case of the negative direct effect 
settlement. Given the lengthy ten-year transitional period of market liberalisation between 
the EU and Ukraine, this political preclusion of direct effect can reasonably be seen as a 
temporary and conditional ‘political hurdle’, the overcoming of which should open the way 
to the less problematic in this regard legal dimension of direct effect that the EU-Ukraine 
association law is, in principle, capable of developing – in view of the ‘clear and precise 
enough’ formulations of certain rights and obligations in the agreement’s text. On the other 
side, however, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’s direct references to, and, in some 
instances, identical provisions with, EU law do complicate the prima facie ‘simplicity’ of the 
political preclusion of direct effect – not least by way of challenging that kind of effect of the 
EU’s internal law itself, which ‘is today presumed to be capable of direct effect’. Schütze (n 
20) 345. 
116 Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer ECLI:EU:C:2002:57.
117 Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Maros Kolpak ECLI:EU:C:2003:255.
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result, direct and indirect forms of discrimination on grounds of national-
ity should be regarded as prohibited under the EU-Ukraine contractual 
association and are therefore fully entitled to judicial remedies.118 In the 
case of Ukraine, the provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
should be regarded as those that may be directly invoked – although a 
sort of commensurate direct effect doctrine has not been developed in 
the Ukrainian legal tradition. 119 As part of the national legislation,120 how-
ever, clear and precise provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agree-
ment that endow Ukrainian citizens and companies with certain rights 
and obligations should be directly applicable121 and enforceable (ie having 
direct effect). 
Significantly, the right of establishment for self-employed persons 
and undertakings under the EU-Ukraine AA, along with trade in services 
and cooperation in electronic commerce, draws on a rather highly liberal 
approach aiming at the progressive reciprocal liberalisation of these do-
mains as laid down by article 85 para 1 EU-UA AA. Again, the liberalisa-
tion does not cover the very substance of the free movement of persons 
– entry and residence rights – as established within the EU’s internal 
market. Article 85 para 5 EU-UA AA excludes from the envisaged liberali-
sation clause the rights to entry and residence for Ukrainian (as also for 
EU) citizens seeking access to the employment market:
This Chapter shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons 
seeking access to the employment market of a Party, nor shall it ap-
ply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on 
a permanent basis’ (article 85 para 5 EU-UA AA).
The right of establishment does not therefore relate to activities car-
ried out by way of gainful employment. It implies economic activities 
carried out by a person outside any relationship of subordination with 
regard to the conditions of work or remuneration under his/her own per-
sonal responsibility.122 As defined in the ECJ’s Factortame II ruling,123 the 
‘establishment’ of a natural or legal person involves the actual pursuit of 
118 For a detailed comparative overview of the rights of third-country nationals under EU 
association agreements, see Daniel Thym and Margarite Zoeteweij-Turhan, Rights of Third-
Country Nationals under EU Association Agreements: Degrees of Free Movement and Citizen-
ship (Brill/Nijhoff 2015).
119 Unless the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, adopts the law(s) on the imple-
mentation of specific provision(s) of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.
120 Art 9 of the Ukrainian Constitution stipulates that ‘[i]nternational treaties in force, con-
sented by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as binding, shall be an integral part of the na-
tional legislation of Ukraine’.
121 Unless the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, adopts the law(s) on the imple-
mentation of specific provision(s) of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.
122 As defined in the ruling in Case C-268/99 Jany ECLI:EU:C:2001:616, paras 34-50.
123 Case C-221/89 Factortame Limited (Factortame II) ECLI:EU:C:1991:320, para 20.
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an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member 
State for an indefinite period. The notion of ‘establishment’ is defined in 
article 86 para 9 EU-Ukraine AA as follows:
(a) as regards legal persons of the EU Party or of Ukraine, [‘establish-
ment’ means] the right to take up and pursue economic activities by 
means of setting up, including the acquisition of, a legal person and/
or create a branch or a representative office in Ukraine or in the EU 
Party respectively; 
(b) as regards natural persons, [‘establishment’ means] the right of 
natural persons of the EU Party or of Ukraine to take up and pursue 
economic activities as self-employed persons, and to set up under-
takings, in particular companies, which they effectively control’ (Ar-
ticle 86 para 9 EU-UA AA). 
In this regard, mutual determinacy between the right of establish-
ment and the right of entry and residence in EU Member States will be 
assessed through an implicit formal corollary. While not treating the 
problem in absolute terms and cases,124 the case law of the European 
Union recognises nevertheless a directly applicable principal entitlement 
of self-employed nationals from associated countries to enter and to stay 
in EU Member States.125
The provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on trade 
in services, enshrined within the same Chapter 6 ‘Establishment, trade 
in services and electronic commerce’ of Title IV, are quite specific and 
also, to a larger extent, protected under both the association law and the 
European Union law. In contrast to the ‘establishment’, which entails in 
the EU legal order the pursuit of an economic activity from a fixed base 
in a Member State for an indefinite period, the (freedom of) provision of 
services entails the carrying out of an economic activity for a temporary 
period in a Member State in which either the provider or the recipient of 
services is not established.
Falling under the general requirement of ‘progressive reciprocal lib-
eralisation’ as laid down by article 85 para 1 EU-UA AA for establishment, 
trade in services and cooperation on electronic commerce, the supply of 
124 The caveats have to be accounted for as far as ‘immigration clauses’ and ‘opt-out claus-
es’ of several EU Member States are at stake. In the case of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement, provisions on the movement of workers, the right of establishment and thus the 
equal treatment principle are subject to exclusions, due to, eg, Danish, British and Irish 
opt-outs as per special protocols. See, for instance, on this matter, the take of Van der Loo 
et al (n 85) 8.
125 See basically the Gloszczuk case, among a number of cases the ECJ has ruled out in this 
context of the EU’s Europe Agreements with Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic: Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Wieslaw Gloszczuk and Elzbieta Gloszczuk ECLI:EU:C:2001:488.
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cross-border services between the EU and Ukraine is moreover subject to 
the obligation to provide at least the minimally required level of liberal-
ised market access in this domain:
With respect to market access through the cross-border supply of 
services, each Party shall accord services and service suppliers of 
the other Party treatment no less favourable than that provided for 
in the specific commitments contained in Annexes XVI-B and XVI-E 
to this Agreement (article 93 para 1 EU-UA AA).
Once in the market, the services and service suppliers may not be 
discriminated through either different or identical treatment that modi-
fies, or is capable of modifying, the conditions of fair competition, as 
defined by articles 253 to 267 EU-UA AA. Such a ‘national treatment’ for-
mula applicable to trade in services is enshrined in the wording of article 
94 EU-UA AA:
Article 94. National Treatment
1. […] each Party shall grant to services and service suppliers of the 
other Party, in respect of all measures affecting the cross-border 
supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords 
to its own like service and services suppliers.
2. A Party may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 of this Article by 
according to services and service suppliers of the other Party either 
formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it 
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be consid-
ered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition 
in favour of services or service suppliers of the Party compared to 
like services or service suppliers of the other Party. […].
A quasi ‘standstill’ provision meant to prevent any new measures 
restricting the cross-border supply of services is also included. However, 
new measures are only impermissible insofar as they are incompatible 
with the scope, objectives and coverage of Chapter 6 in Title IV of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement:
Each Party shall retain the right to regulate and to introduce new 
regulations to meet legitimate policy objectives, provided they are 
compatible with this Chapter (article 85 para.4 EU-UA AA).
As such, this quasi-standstill clause is not commensurate with the 
one introduced for trade in goods (article 30 EU-UA AA) that has a gen-
eral imperative and unconditional effect. 
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Along with financial, postal, IT and other services briefly covered 
by the chapter, transport services and electronic commerce have gained 
more substantial elaboration. Dealt with within articles 134 to 138 (Sub-
section 7 ‘Transport services’), the supply of cross-border transport ser-
vices is sought to enjoy wide liberalisation as provided by the Chapter’s 
scope, but also gets progressively liberalised and approximated in terms 
of regulation (pursuant to article 138 EU-UA AA) due to the enshrined 
commitments to conclude specific agreements on international maritime 
transport, road, rail and inland waterways transport, and air transport 
within the DCFTA. Importantly, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
treats electronic commerce as ‘the provision of services […], which cannot 
be subject to customs duties’ (article 139 para 3 EU-UA AA). In the con-
text of EU legislation (the E-Commerce Directive)126 and recent case law 
(the ECJ’s judgment in the PFDC case of 13 October 2011),127 this provi-
sion of the EU-Ukraine AA seeks to remove obstacles to cross-border on-
line services within the DCFTA, provide legal certainty for business and 
citizens, and enhance competitiveness in this quickly developing domain. 
As such, it is another mechanism that allows the stipulated ‘stake in the 
EU internal market’ for the Ukrainian economy and ‘economic operators’. 
Ultimately, the freedom to provide information society services belongs to 
one of the benefits of the EU’s internal market as laid down by article 3 
of the e-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) and will also be applicable 
to the provision of services within the DCFTA as to be established pur-
suant to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The EU’s most recent 
initiatives on the establishment of the Digital Single Market, a Commis-
sion priority under the Estonian EU Presidency in 2017,128 and Ukraine’s 
recent bid for access to it, provide an example of yet another dimension 
of integration that can be pursued under the dynamic framework of EU-
Ukraine primary and secondary association law.
4 Conclusions
The famous approach of ‘sharing everything but institutions’, as in-
troduced by former European Commission President Romano Prodi in 
2003, reads slightly differently (ie not that much exclusionist) if EU law 
and, by extension, association law are considered from a legal-institu-
tionalist perspective. As a matter of fact, the European Union’s offer of a 
126 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) [2000] OJ L178/1. 
127 Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Conseil de la concurrence (now 
Autorité de la concurrence (the French Competition Authority)) ECLI:EU:C:2011:649.
128 European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market: Bringing down barriers to unlock online 
opportunities’ <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en> ac-
cessed 13 September 2017.
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‘stake in EU law’, granted to the newly associated states, presents an of-
fer to share the very foundational institution of European integration and 
the related normative order. Depending on the teleological rationale and 
the extent of the regulatory content, the EU’s ‘association law’ derived 
from its contractual association links with third states resembles yet an-
other level of joint ownership between the EU and third states. Distinct 
from the EU and third country legal orders themselves in which it is em-
bedded, the institution of ‘association law’ serves as both a junctural and 
transactional interface, as well as a particular proxy normative order that 
influences both legal systems, although with well-articulated asymmetry.
In the context of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the rel-
evant ‘association law’ currently resembles mainly a body of primary 
sources (the agreement itself, including the annexes to it and protocols, 
as well as a number of institutional and national acts on the agreement’s 
conclusion and ratification). The secondary association law has so far 
been enacted by the EU-Ukraine Association Council in a limited volume 
– not least because of the only recently ensuing full enactment of this 
mixed international agreement. Nonetheless, its effects upon the Ukrain-
ian domestic order started unfolding even at the agreement’s provisional 
application stage. Notwithstanding the non-accession nature of the EU-
Ukraine contractual association, the model of enhanced political align-
ment and economic integration seems to be sufficient to provide for the 
establishment of a distinct and potentially dynamic normative order of 
the EU-Ukraine association law. The envisaged obligatory observance of 
the Union’s principles and values, as well as the imperative of EU law-
conform interpretation of the substantive (primary and future secondary) 
association law lead to a quasi-amalgamation not only of economic, but 
also of legal orders and, thereby, to a legal fiction of Ukraine being part 
of the Union’s legal system. Naturally, economic integration, with the 
DCFTA as its axial component, lies at the heart of this legal and political 
exercise in normative-order sharing. Thereby, association law, including 
the DCFTA’s substantial and procedural law, presents an institution of a 
kind which is sought to both enable and enforce the envisaged bilateral 
integration process. The article has shown that the institution of EU-
Ukraine association law embraces several facets of integration-oriented 
association, including participatory (a ‘stake in the EU law and market’) 
and instrumental (transactional, functional) dimensions. It is the inter-
play of both, with the guiding rationale of the participatory association 
and the enabling features of the instrumental association, which pro-
vides for the effective functionalist extension and sharing of the institu-
tion of EU law while creating the opportunities for joint ownership and 
integration through association in the framework of the interpretation, 
application and implementation of EU-Ukraine ‘association law’. 
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Annex I
Table 1. Overview of the structure and content of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement
Title Titling Content outline
I General Principles objectives of the agreement (read in con-
junction with the Preamble), including: 
establishment of association relation-
ship, gradual convergence between the 
EU and Ukraine on the basis of com-
mon values , deepened economic and 
trade relations, strengthened coopera-
tion on justice, freedom and security, 
as well as on general principles; general 
principles themselves that have inspired 
the EU’s own creation, including: demo-
cratic (democratic governance, rule of 
law, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, human dignity, equality and 
solidarity, multilateralism, etc) and free 
market economy (rule of law, good gov-
ernance, fair competition, fight against 
corruption, sustainable development 
and effective multilateralism) principles;




Convergence in the 
Field of Foreign and 
Security Policy
convergence in foreign and security 
policy; international stability and secu-
rity based on multilateralism; strength-
ening of regional stability; cooperation 
in defence and security; strengthening 
peace and international justice, in par-
ticular through the implementation of 
the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court; conflict prevention, 
crisis management, non-proliferation, 
disarmament and arms control; fight 
against terrorism;
III Justice, Freedom and 
Security
cooperation and rapprochement in law 
enforcement systems, migration man-
agement, personal data protection, rule 
of law; strengthening the judiciary – its 
effectiveness, independence and impar-
tiality; judicial cooperation in civil and 
criminal matters; cooperation in the fight 
against crime and corruption; coopera-
tion in the fight against illegal drugs; 
cooperation in fighting terrorism;
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IV Trade and Trade-
related Matters
establishment of a deep and compre-
hensive free trade area as an objective 
and guiding rationale of cooperation in 
trade and trade-related matters; eco-
nomic integration (‘stake in the EU 
internal market’); relevant agreement 
provisions divided into the following 
sections: trade in goods (national treat-
ment and access for goods, elimina-
tion of customs duties, fees and other 
charges, elimination of non-tariff bar-
riers to free trade, trade facilitation 
mechanisms; rules of origin, etc); trade 
in services (establishment, trade in ser-
vices, e-commerce, national treatment 
and MFN clauses); movement of per-
sons; movement of capital; regulatory 
harmonisation in the field of public pro-
curement; competition, transparency, 
and state aid regulations (prohibition 
of anti-competitive practices, antitrust 
measures, state aid regulation, etc); 
protection of intellectual property; settle-
ment of disputes; mediation mechanism; 
132 Andriy Tyushka: Association-cum-Integration: The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement...
V Economic and Sector 
Cooperation
objectives, tasks, guidelines for 
and forms of trade cooperation 
and sustainable development 
in 28 areas: energy; macroeco-
nomic cooperation; manage-
ment of public finances; taxa-
tion; statistics; environment; 
transport; space; science and 
technology; industrial and 
enterprise policy; mining and 
metallurgy; financial services; 
company law, corporate gov-
ernance, accounting and au-
diting; information society; 
audio-visual policy; tourism; 
agriculture and rural develop-
ment; fisheries and maritime 
polices; cooperation on the 
Danube river; consumer pro-
tection; employment, social 
policy and equal opportuni-
ties; public health; education, 
training and youth; culture; 
sport and physical activity; 
civil society cooperation; cross-
border and regional coopera-
tion; participation in EU pro-
grammes and agencies;




tion of and the fight against 
fraud, corruption and other 
illegal activities, EU financial 
assistance to Ukraine in this 
framework;
VII Institutional, General 
and Final Provisions
establishment, structural and 
functional engineering of the 
new institutional framework 
designed to facilitate the im-
plementation of the Associa-
tion Agreement, including: As-
sociation Council, Association 
Committee, Parliamentary As-
sociation Committee, special 
committees / bodies, Civil So-
ciety Platform; stipulations on 
provisional application; dis-
pute settlement mechanism.
Source: Author’s own compilation.
